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IN THE

Supreme Court
of the

STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COPPER COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

STEPHEN HAY8 ESTATE, Inc., a
corporation of Utah, JULIA HAYS
HOGE, STEPHEN J. HAYS,
LAWRENCE J. HAYS, MRS.
LOU GOREY, MRS. ETHEL V.
REILLEY and MARY LOUISE
O'DONNELL,
Defendants and Appellants

Case No.

5302

RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANTS'
REPLY BRIEF
I.
Point
A liquid or artificial increment artificially produced and
added to a natural stream or introduced into a natural channel,
by the labor of man without intent to abandon, belongs to the
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man whose labor produced it or brought it there when naturally it would not have existed there. Such liquid increment
may be taken out of the natural stream or channel by its
owner and may be recaptured and reclaimed by him, at such
point on the natural channel as may best serve the owner's
purpose. Water Rights in the Western States, 3d Ed. Wiel,
Vol. 1, p. 38.

The copper solutions with which this case is concerned are not waters within the definition about which
have been evolved the law of waters and water rights.
These copper solutions are not suitable for the irrigation of land, for they would forthwith kill instead of
nurture vegetation of any character upon land, and in
addition, would speedily ruin the land for any agricultural use. Correlative right or reasonable use doctrines
could have no applicability to such waters, because there
would never be any use for them upon the lands out of
which they might have their source. Their character
forbids their use for culinary purposes-no human being
could retain them upon his stomach should he succeed
in swallowing them ; and if he could retain them they
would kill him. The law relating to culinary waters
therefore can have no applicability to these solutions.
They are not suitable for other municipal uses because
neither human flesh nor the municipal facilities could
withstand their corrosive effect. They are not suitable
to the generation of electric power, for they would consume the very generating facilities over which they flowed.

Indeed, it is not as water for any of its uses

that defendants seek them.
2

Defendants boldly admit

they seek only the copper in solution in them, the liquid
serving merely as a vehicle by which the copper from
plaintiff's deposits would be transported to defendants'
facilities for the latter's appropriation, and this liquid
for plaintiff's purposes serves as the vehicle by which
plaintiff's copper is transported over the right of way
condemned to plaintiff's facilities for preservation and
marketing by the latter.
These solutions are solely the artificial product of
plaintiff's industry, but for which they would not naturally exist in Dixon Gulch. They are suitable only
for the one purpose for which plaintiff created them,
namely, the reduction of plaintiff's low grade ore deposits in Dixon Gulch by the only known process permitting of their reduction to plaintiff's profit, namely,
through the process of leaching and precipitation wherein the copper solutions represent the intermediate stage,
the solutions in the production of which plaintiff has
artificially employed natural laws and forces, sending
the resulting solutions down Dixon Gulch across defendants' premises over the right of way condemned
and into plaintiff's pipe lines and thence over the
premises of many others on their way to plaintiff's
precipitating plant at the mouth of Bingham Canyon
for the conclusion of the process. Any attempt to apply to this chemical so artificially produced, the law of
su1bterranean or surface waters finds support in only

3

one common attribute, namely, that both are liquids, but
that is a flimsy pretext upon which to erect a theory
by which to divest from the title the one by whose
investment, industry and expenditures the solutions were
produced.
In Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Con. Mng.
Co., 69 Utah 423, 255 Pac. 672, this court held:
Thus, under the circumstances, we are of the
opinion that the waters carrying copper or other
minerals in solutions, so long as they are in the
dump and thus a part of it, and before they leave
it and percolate through the soil and earth on
the claim or claims of the defendant not conveyed
to the plaintiff, are, like the dump itself, the property of the plaintiff: * * * Were the plaintiff attempting to follow, collect, and divert waters, though they carry copper in solution, after
they have left the dump and percolating in and
through the soil and ground of the defendant not
conveyed to the plaintiff, the cited cases would
be applicable, but that is not what the plaintiff
seeks to do. It may readily be conceded that
waters, though they carry copper or other minerals in solution, which are suffered and permitted to flow and escape from the dump and seep
and percolate through the soil and earth of the
defendant's claims not conveyed to the plaintiff
and on or in which it has no surface or other
rights, are lost to the plaintiff and become the
property of the defendant and may not be pursued or reclaimed or taken by the plaintiff.
That conclusion can be, and no doubt in the mind of
the court was, supported by the fact that if such wa4

ters or solutions were allowed to flow, seep or percolate
in lands wherein their owner had no right or interest,
such waters or solutions would have thereby become
abandoned by their owner and title in the latter accordingly would have ceased. The cases reviewed in that
connection were cases of abandoned water, oil, etc., wherein it was held that by reason of such abandonment title
in their previous owner had ceased. The well-established
rule stated in the subject point of this discussion is confined to those cases where the owner of such liquid increment had added it to the natural stream or introduced
it into the natural channel "without intent to abandon."
In the case at bar, for years before the Dixon Gulch
dumps had been started, plaintiff had employed this process in the reduction of its many low grade ore deposits
('Tr. 374, 182 to 196, 205 to 215, 230 to 235, 241 to 246,
659, Ex. 38) and the method commonly employed in the
collection and diversion of the copper solutions from
those dumps or deposits was the method described in
Utah Copper Co. vs. Montana-Bingham Con. Mng. Co.,
and in the case at bar, namely, the collection of the solutions on and above bedrock at or down the gulch below
the toe of the dump at a point where the channel narrows and bedrock is readily accessible. In the case at
bar, there lies between plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch
and its intake on Tract C a railroad fill necessitating
plaintiff's condemning the bottom of the gulch in its
natural condition as a conduit for its copper solutions
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as they pass down the gulch through the railroad fill.
Were the railroad fill not there, plaintiff would have
proceeded here as it had elsewhere, namely, would have
constructed its intake in the bottom of the gulch below
the placer gravels, where the channel was narrow and
bedrock was readily accessible. Plaintiff cannot in the
case at bar drive a tunnel beneath the top of bedrock
to intercept by its raise and wings plaintiff's copper
solutions at plaintiff's boundary, because such diverting
structures under the circumstances there existing would
not only be prohibitive in initial cost but would be
imposs~ble of maintenance at any cost. (Tr. 375 to 383,
2272 to 2277) The copper solutions from plaintiff's
dumps above do not all sink perpendicularly to the top
of bedrock and thence down the bottom of this precipitous gulch on bedrock, but instead, while traveling generally downward, do so at all angles, the railroad fill
over the whole of Tract D ,being saturated at times by
the solutions as they follow their course down the gulch
to their outlet at the so-called Hays Spring. (Tr. 320,
323 to 338) Indeed, the so-called Hays Spring issues out
of the railroad fill at a point six to ten feet up in the
material of that fill. (Tr. 219, 301, 333, 1866).
Plaintiff's intent not to abandon its copper solutions has been always consistently manifest. In the
course of the trial as part of plaintiff's proof of its title
to the copper solutions in Dixon Gulch (Tr. 630 to 642,
644 to 647, 690 to 691) plaintiff offered in evidence as
6

plaintiff's Exhibit 36 plaintiff's application to the State
Engineer of the State of Utah, File No. 9990, received
in the office of that .official June 11, 1926, seeking to
appropriate the copper solutions to be created by the
leaching of plaintiff's low grade ores and material then
being and thereafter to be dumped in Dixon Gulch, the
explanatory clause of that application being as follows:
In the course of its mining operations in
Bingham Oanyon in West Mountain Mining District in Salt Lake County, Utah, applicant will
dump in Dixon Gulch, in Bingham Canyon, said
mining district, county and state, a great quantity
of overburden or low grade copper ores. The
copper contained in such overburden or copper
ore, after such overburden or ore shall have
been exposed to the action of the air and meteoric
or other waters, will become soluble in water and
will be capable of recovery by precipitating the
same by the aid of copper precipitants.
It is the intention of applicant to gather
at the point of diversion designated herein the
waters flowing in Dixon Gulch for which this application is made and from whatsoever source
the same may come, including the accumulations
in said dump of meteoric and other waters of
which applicant may be the absolute owner, and
after the dumping in said gulch by applicant to
collect the copper-laden waters at said point of
diversion after their percolation through or
beneath said dump in boxes or sluices or
other devices and remove the copper held therein
in solution by precipitating the same upon scrap
iron or other agents. It is also the intention of
applicant to use said waters, being the waters
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for which this application is made, in the spraying and treatment of said dump for the purpose
of leaching therefrom the copper content thereof,
to precipitate and remove the copper and other
valuable content from said waters and gather together the precipitates and ship and sell the same
to smelters, reduction plants and other buyers.
After the removal from said water of such valuable contents the said water will be permitted by
applicant to flow out of applicant's said boxes,
sluices or other containers and to waste itself below such boxes, sluices or other devices, finding
its way into Bingham Creek, at point of return
designated herein.
The court refused to admit that application and
plaintiff excepted. On defendants' cross examination
Mr. Goodrich explained that the day before, October 23,
1928, an amendment had been filed to the application,
Exhrbit 36, changing the point of diversion from ''near
the lower portal of the Dixon drain tunnel to a point
on the westerly end of Tract C as shown on Exhibit
No.6." (Tr. 645) Mr. Goodrich testified (Tr. 638) that
the application, Exhibit 36, "was made to preserve the
Utah 'Copper Company's ownership in the waters in
Dixon Gulch on the property west of the Valentine Scrip
as against any adverse filings. We do not believe that
the state engineer has jurisdiction over waters of this
character, but we wanted to take every precaution as
against some one else, to preserve the ownership to
our own waters.'' In making the offer plaintiff's counsel said in part:

(Tr. 632)
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It is an application to appropriate the waters of this stream and I would say to your
Honor that we do not predicate our claim to title
to these waters upon any theory that they are
public waters or within the jurisdiction of the
State Engineer. I am bringing out by this witness that the purpose of this application was
simply to safeguard the plaintiff's property in
the event the State Engineer or the Court might
rule some day that these waters are public waters within the State Engineer's jurisdiction and
could be appropriated. I understand the State
Engineer in one case involving copper waters
from these dumps has so held. * * * That
is not our theory of plaintiff's title. In our
opinion these waters are not public waters and
are in no way within the jurisdiction of the State
Engineer.

Later on a large part of Exhibit 36 was admitted
in evidence on defendants' offer on the theory that the
fact that the point of diversion therein described before
its amendment was on plaintiff's property near the
lower portal of the railroad drain tunnel was an admission by plaintiff that all the copper solutions from
plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch would flow down and
through the drain tunnel and out its lower portal. (Tr.
1509 to 1515) At the time the application Exhibit No.
36 was made, namely, .June 11, 1926, the drain tunnel
was dry, because plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch had
been begun only the preceding January, and of course
had not attained such magnitude as to have been able
to supply any copper solutions to the drain tunnel. Mr.
9

Goodrich explained that his selection of that point of
diversion had been dictated 'by his desire to describe a
point on plaintiff's property, which he did near the
lower portal of the railroad drain tunnel ''before someone else might get such an appropriation for copper
solutions coming down Dixon Gulch so as to protect
the Utah Copper Company in so far as I could should
such an issue come up." ( Tr. 646) The court below
found (Finding No. XXXII, Abs. 620) that the copper
solutions crossing Tract D

* * * come to and into the railroad fill from
and through plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch
above the railroad fill, have flowed and percolated down into and laterally through the railroad fill, have flowed down the bottom of Dixon
Gulch on bedrock or on and through surface
soil in the bottom of Dixon Gulch and emerged
from the downhill slope and near the toe of the
railroad fill in the bottom of Dixon Gulch. The
course so pursued by said waters is definitely
known and positively defined, said course being
Dixon Gulch down to, through and across Tract
D, and the whole thereof, and above bed-rock.
The so-called Hays Spring is not a spring.
These copper waters or solutions do not arise on
defendants' property from subterranean sources.
By its application Exhibit 36 and the amendment
thereof plaintiff anticipated what to it was a remote
contingency, namely, that its copper solutions it had
set about to produce in Dixon Gulch might be held to be
water flowing in a known and defined channel down
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Dixon Gulch, public water susceptible to appropriation
through filings made as provided by statute in the office
of the state engineer. However remote the contingency,
plaintiff acted, even before plaintiff had brought its
copper solutions into existence, to fully protect against
any attack its title in those solutions to be made. There
would never have been any copper solutions in Dixon
Gulch had plaintiff not created them there, all of which
plaintiff understood when it deposited its ores there
and when in anticipation of attack, plaintiff acquired
title to Dixon Gulch from the westerly boundary of
defendants' Valentine Scrip Patent on up the gulch
over its drainage area. As plaintiff's dumps in Dixon
Gulch progressed, plaintiff watched the copper solutions
emanating from them, and when in March of 1928 (Tr.
50) they had become sufficiently rich to permit of their
profitable treatment in the pr·ecipitation f'acilities of the
lessee Robbe, plaintiff instituted this suit to condemn
a right of way for their conduct and collection upon
defendants' premises, the very purpose of which was
to prevent their abandonment, to prevent their aeqmsition by another upon any pretext.
In Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Con. Mng.
Co., this court had held:

* * * the waters carrying copper or other
minerals in solution, so long as they are in the
dump and thus a part of it, and before they leave
it and percolate through the soil and earth on the
11

claim or claims of the defendant not conveyed
to the plaintiff, are, like the dump itself, the
property of the plaintiff; * * * ( 255 Pac.
672)
which was interpreted by the United States District
Court for the District of Utah upon further action by
Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company to
mean: (Respondent's Brief, pp. 68-9)
Utah Copper Company is the owner of the
dump or deposit here involved and all the earth,
rock, ores, minerals, waste, water and all other
substances therein contained, including copper
and other minerals in solution, also the water and
copper or other minerals in solution flowing,
seeping or percolating therefrom, not only from
and out of said dump but from on top of the
surface soil or material beneath said dump and
on bedrock beneath said surface soil or material
beneath said dump and from within the surface
soil and material between bedrock and the bottom of said dump, and that the fact that said
copper solutions touch, wet or saturate the top
of said surface soil beneath said dump or seep
into or percolate through said surface soil beneath said dump, or touch, wet or flow along,
over or upon bedrock beneath said dump, neither
has resulted nor will result in the passing from
the defendant Utah Copper Company to the
plaintiff Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining
Company of title to said waters and solutions,
but on the contrary the defendant Utah Copper
Company was and has eontinued, is now and
will continue, the owner of said copper solutions
while in the dump, while on the surface of the
soil beneath the dump, while on bedrock beneath
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the dump, and while in the soil and material between bedrock and the bottom of the dump or the
top of the surface soil and material beneath said
dump; and said copper solutions have been heretofore at all times, are now and will continue to
be the property of the defendant Utah Copper
'Company while on and above bedrock, until the
same shall have flowed out and seeped and percolated in and through the soil of the plaintiff's
mining claims, laterally ·beyond the periphery of
said dump or deposit and off of and from the
surface right, interest and estate heretofore conveyed to defendant * * *
It will be remembered that the right Utah Copper

Company had acquired in Tiewaukee Gulch was by contract and it was nothing more than an easement to dump
and remove the material deposited there, without express
mention of copper solutions, but this court held: (255
Pac. 674-5)

* * * the defendant makes no claim to any of
the ore or other material deposited on the dump;
and, since the copper in solution is from the
dump and from the ore and material deposited
t.hereon and therein and not otherwise, it would
seem that the defendant has no better claim to
the mineral in solution, so long as it is in the
dump, than the ore or other material in the
dump. * * * The surface of that ground and
upon which the dump rests was conveyed to the
plaintiff. True, it was conveyed for dumping
purposes, but, so long as the surface is occupied
by the dump, it, as surface ground, is not susceptible of any other use; and waters falling on and
flowing or seeping through the dump, so long
13

as they are in the dump, do not fall on or seep
or percolate through soil of the defendant or on
or through any surface right owned by it but
on a surface right and material, ore, rock, and
earth owned by the plaintiff. * * * No waters percolating through the soil of the defendant are here involved and are not sought or attempted to be taken by the plaintiff. * * *
(255 Pac. 672)
T,he easement acquired by condemnation in the suit
at bar was for the express purpose of conveying these
copper solutions from plaintiff's premises across Tract
D and into the receptacle in Tract C, yet counsel ap-

parently argue in the face of the foregoing decision
by this court that an easement is not a sufficient interest
in defendant's premises for this purpose, that an easement is a mere right and that notwithstanding the right
in plaintiff to conduct its copper solutions across defendants' premises that nevertheless the moment those
solutions pass the boundary line between the two properties, title thereto vests in defendants as the owners
of the fee. If the easement involved in Utah Copper
Co. v. Montana-Bingham Con. Mng. Co., acquired by a
contract silent with relation to copper solutions, was
sufficient to preserve in Utah Oopper Company title
thereto until those solutions had seeped or percolated
beyond the premises on which their owner had an easement and so had become abandoned property, then of
course, in the case at bar, where the easement acquired
by this suit is for the express purpose of conveying
14

those copper solutions across Tract D and into the
catchment on Tract C, the interest so acquired is ample
to enable Utah Copper Company to preserve its title
throughout this intermediate step in the reduction process to which it has subjected and shall subject the ores
it has deposited and shall deposit in Dixon Gulch for
that purpose. Defendants' contention that a court
order for immediate occupation for the purpose stated
and a judgment and final order of condemnation for
those stated purposes are nullities, 'because an easement
is not a sufficient estate to prevent the passing to the
owner of the fee of title to the copper solutions conveyed in the exercise of the right so acquired for the
accomplishment of such stated purposes-is indeed
illogical and astonishingly shallow. Counsel with a frankness that is actual, although we can find nothing to commend it, announce their intention of resorting to every
defense of which they can conceive to compel plaintiff
to abandon its copper solutions so that defendants may
acquire title thereto, and their argument to that end is
branded all over with compelling evidence of that determination, an unworthy effort that is nota,ble only for
its audacity.
It is said m Wiel "-Water Rights in the Western

States," 3d ed. Vol. 1, § 38, p. 40, that "the intention
not to abandon the water turns the stream channel into
a mere means of conveyance.''

15

It is not our intention to cite authority at great

length upon a rule of law as unanimously approved as
that constituting the subject-point of this discussion.

It

is said in the note appearing in 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) at
page 1065 that:
It seems to be the universal rule that where
a person by his own exertions increases the available supply of water in a stream,-that is, adds
water to a stream which would not otherwise
have flowed thore,-he as against other appropriators has the right to appropriate and use such
water to tho extent of the increase, whether such
water is obtained from underground sources or
from other water sheds.
The Utah statue upon this subject is Sec. 9., Chapter

72, Laws of Utah 1921, at page 189.

We will refer to

only two or three cases out of the multitude declaring
the rule.
Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 46, was decided in 1857,
and it was an effort on the part of appropriators of the
waters of a stream flowing down a ravine to enjoin
the use of that natural channel by others as a part of
their ditch or canal system for the conveyance of water
derived from other sources. The appropriators contended that permitting the water of the artificial ditch to
escape and flow down the channel of a natural stream
was an abandonment of the ditch water, whether there
were an intention to take the latter out below or not.
The court held:
there was, at the time of commence16

ment of this suit, no natural water flowing in
the bed of the stream, and that all the waters
so diverted by the defendants were artificial, or
waters conducted there by them.
The plaintiff being the prior locators, it
would follow that any interference with the waters of Dutch Gulch would be an infraction of
their rights. But the appropriation of the waters
did not give them the exclusive use of the bed
of the stream. We see no reason why it might
not be used by others, as a channel for conducting water, so long as it did not interfere with
their rights. * * *

It would be a harsh rule * * * to require those engaged in these enterprises to construct an actual ditch along the whole route
through which the waters were carried, and to
refuse them the economy that nature occasionally
afforded in the shape of a dry ravine, gulch, or
canon. * * *
In Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 103 Pac. 641,
23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1065, the court discussed Hoffman
v. Stone, supra, and continued:

* * * This rule was extended in the case
of Butte 'Canal & Ditch Co. v. Vaughn, 11 Cal.
143, 70 Am. Dec. 769, wherein Mr. Justice ]'ield,
who has so ably and clearly differentiated the
law of appropriation from the rules of the common law, said: "It does not necessarily follow
that the water introduced by the defendants became subject to the use of the plaintiffs because
its identity was lost by being mingled with the
water naturally flowing in the creek. The rights
17

of the parties, after such mingling, are not unlike
the rights of the owners of goods of equal value
after their mixture,-both are entitled to take
their given quantity." * * *
citing many cases, including the decision of this court
in Herriman Irr. Co. v. Butterfield Mng. & Mill. Co.,
19 Utah 453, 51 L. R. A. 930, 57 Pac. 537.
We quote further from Miller v. W,heeler as follows:
Ownership implies responsibility. If our
reasoning requires further support, the fact that
the appellants, Wheeler and Morse, because of
the artificial augmentation of the natural flow of
the Squillchuck, would be held liable for all damage done to the lower appropriators from flooding their lands, injuring the banks of the stream,
or washing out their improvements, needs only
to be mentioned to meet approval. * * *
Were the copper solutions ,here involved a substance the defendants did not desire, a substance from
which defendants could not profit, but instead one of
which the presence might injure defendants or their
property, how outraged the defendants would be,-how
indignantly the defendants would charge the plaintiff
with the nuisance and seek to subject plaintiff to the
liability to result from having made in Dixon Gulch
and emptied upon defendants' property solutions calculated to damage defendants. Whether or not the copper
solutions be of value and a source of profit, might be
calculated to arouse the cupidity of the defendants, but
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still could not be a criterion by which to define title.
It is said in Lewis, Eminent Domain, 3d ed., Vol. 1,
page 153, that:
A railroad company constructed an embankment which formed a barrier to the natural flow
of surface water and caused the same to collect
in a ditch beside the road, in which it ran for a
long distance and was then diseharged through a
culvert upon the plaintiff's land, where it had
not been accustomed to flow before. The company was held liable on the ground of its being
a taking. And, generally, it is a taking to collect
surface water into a channel and turn it in a
body upon the land of another, * * * all the
cases recognize the right of a proprietor not to be
injured by having the water poured upon his
land in a stream, and if this right is interfered
with by a permanent maintenance of the works
causing the injury, there is a taking within the
constitution. * * *
and again at pages 165 and 166:

* * * One who creates or permits noxious and offensive substances upon his premises
ought to take care that they do not escape either
in a fluid or gaseous form into or upon his
neighbor's land. The owner of land has a right
not to be injured in this manner, and an interference with this right would be a taking, if done
under the power of eminent domain.
Likewise Tract D condemned is a natural outlet for
waters from works for the reduction of ores or mineral
deposits within the provision of paragraph 6 of § 7330,
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Compiled Laws of Utah 1917. Plaintiff's precipitating
plants are "works for the reduction of ores," and Tract
D condemned is a ''ditch for supplying works for the
reduction of ores with water," under the provisions of
paragraph 5 of § 7330, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917,
in this instance, copper water. Tract D condemned is
also "a ditch to facilitate the reduction of ores or mineral deposits" within the meaning of paragraph 6 of
§ 7330, it being a necessary link in the process necessarily employed. Tract D as condemned is an easement or right of way for a ditch "or other means of
conveying water" for the pu'blic use of mining and for
"drainage" from plaintiff's reduction works, under the
provisions of Sec. 4, of Ohapter 67, Laws of Utah 1919.
Water is the name properly applied to an endless
variety of liquids; it is not confined to pure water (H20).
It is foolish to contend that the statutes referred to
were intended to apply only to those waters of a certain
chemical analysis and not to others; the statutes do not
differentiate. It does not follow from this, however,
that an artificially produced chemical, although liquid
in character, is water within the contemplation of the
law of water and water rights. The copper solutions
with which we are here concerned are not waters in the
latter sense 'because they have not more than one of the
attributes of water with which the law of waters has to
do. Their one common characteristic is their liquidity,
wherefore by analogy their abandoment has been ruled
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by the law of waters. We are aware of no authority
wherein the analogy has been further pursued.
Plaintiff's deposits in Dixon Gulch are" permanent
works" and by them plaintiff has produced and is producing the copper solutions about which this controversy revolves. Plaintiff's production of those solutions
by means of these "permanent works" entails, as one
step in the process, the conveyance of that product over
this natural channel on defendants' premises. Accordingly plaintiff instituted this suit and condemned that
right, the defendants refusing to grant the right because
they hoped by their refusal to acquire the product for
themselves. Plaintiff is the owner of every ingredient
entering into the solutions and of every facility employed in their production. Defendants own nothing,
not even the rights of way now condemned over which
plaintiff is conducting its solutions to plaintiff's precipitating plant; the stipulated purchase price for such
rights of way condemned, the sum of $500.00, plaintiff
has paid and taken its final order of condemnation accordingly. It would be an astonishing thing were a
court to lend its powers to the furtherance of defendants' scheme.
And we quote further from Miller v. Wheeler,
supra, as follows:

* • * abandonment, like appropriation, is
a question of intent, and to be determined with
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reference to the conduct of the parties. The intent to abandon, and an actual relinquishment,
must concur, for courts will not lightly decree an
abandonment of a property so valuable, as that
of water in an irrigated region. Farnham, Waters, 691. "" "" "" The fact that the surplus is
allowed to run into a natural water way to which
rights of appropriation have attached is a circumstance to be considered, but does not shift the
1burden of proving an abandonment from respondents. "" "" ""
In Ditch Co. v. Angiola Water Co., 149 Cal., 496,
86 Pac. 1081, the court held:
A person who is making an appropriation of
water from a natural source or stream is not
bound to carry it to the place of use through a
ditch or artificial conduit, or through a ditch
or canal cut especially for that purpose. He may
make use of any natural or artificial channel or
natural depression which he may find available
and convenient for that purpose, and his appropriation so made will, so far as such means of
taking is concerned, be as effectual as if he had
carried it through a ditch or pipe line made for
that purpose and no other. (Syllabus.)
It was held in Platte Valley Irr. Co. v. Buckers

Mill. & Improv. Co., 25 Colo. 77, 53 Pac. 334, that one
who had increased the average continuous flow of a
stream by his own energy and expenditure was entitled
to such increase. Plaintiff in the case at bar has not,
as yet at least, diverted waters from other sources
upon its dumps in Dixon Gulch, although the easement
22

hereby condemned is broad enough for that purpose,
and of course when market conditions shall make such
increased leaching operations profitable to plaintiff, undoubtedly the dumps will be sprayed with water from
other sources. Presently, however, the "average continuous flow'' in Dixon Gulch has been increased by
plaintiff's energy and expenditure. Mr. Earl testified:
(Tr. 48)

* * * A dump is just like a big sponge
and it gathers the water as the snow melts and
the rain falls, holds it back and distributes it
over a longer period of time. We know from
experience that many times gulches that were
damaged by floods had no floods whatever after
the dumps were placed there, but a continual
stream of water flowed where there had been
none before. Many of these gulches were dry
before the dumps were there except the periods
of runoff, and after making dumps of those
gulches a steady stream of water flowed from
them.
and again (Tr. 195-6):

* • * As to whether after the creation of
these dumps a greater or less quantity of water
was observed to flow from them,-as I previously stated, where there has been no continuous
flow a continuous flow develops in those gulches,
and where there has been a continuous flow of
water, generally it was materially increased and
in some cases as much as four or five times as
much. With relation to Dixon Gulch in this respect, * * * taking the years 1927 and 1928
there has been a material increase in the flow.
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But plaintiff by its energy and expenditure not
only created the solutions the defendants would like to
appropriate, but is as well the only appropriator of
the flow! The copper in the water, not the water, is
the thing to acquire which defendants persist, and as to
the copper plaintiff has contributed and still contri.butes
the whole of it to the stream flow.
We were asked at the close of the oral argument
if it were not necessary that we have a right in aid of
which the law of eminent domain were invoked. In
plaintiff's brief at pages 125 to 127, we called attention
to the authorities to the contrary, to the effect that ''an
action under the Eminent Domain Act cannot be converted into an action to quiet title," wherefore it was
held that in an action to condemn an easement for the
conveyance of water for irrigation it was not an admissible defense that there was no water available for
that purpose. To similar effect was the case of State
v. Superior Court, 20 Wash. 454, 55 Pac. 635. But in
the case at bar there is no occasion to avoid that issue.
Plaintiff's right in aid of which it seeks to invoke the
law of eminent domain is plaintiff's ownership of the
copper solutions on its own property, which solutions it
must transport to plaintiff's precipitating plant at the
mouth of Bingham Canyon, if plaintiff is to complete
the reduction of its dumps or deposits in Dixon Gulch
and save to itself the copper in the ores plaintiff has
24

transported to and deposited in Dixon Gulch for that
purpose.
We were then asked if we should not do something
by way of collecting those solutions at our boundary
before permitting them to flow across defendants' premises, by which to evidence our title in them. Plaintiff
has done this: Plaintiff purchased the drainage area
of Dixon Gulch down to defendants' boundary line for
the purpose of providing a site for the deposit of its low
grade ores and overburden where their copper content
could be leached and saved to plaintiff. Plaintiff blasted
ores and overburden out of plaintiff's mine where that
material occurred in place, loaded it on cars and transported it by rail to Dixon Gulch and there deposited it
in such broken condition not only that it might thereby
be removed from the other phase of plaintiff's mining
operations, but as well be subjected to the oxidizing
agency of the air and meteoric waters whereby its copper content might be leached and saved to plaintiff by the
process herein described. Plaintiff purchased the ~
for, and at plaintiff's expense constructed, a precipitating plant at the mouth of Bingham Canyon in which to
receive these and other copper solutions and precipiate
the copper therein contained and reduce it to the form
required for shipment and smelting. Plaintiff acquired
rights of way for pipe lines from its several dumps
including those in Dixon Gulch down the canyon to its
precipitating plant, constructed pipe lines and trans-
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ported its solutions accordingly.

Plaintiff instituted

this proceeding to condemn an easement for the conveyance of its copper solutions from plaintiff's deposits
in Dixon Gulch down the natural channel of the gulch
over defendants' property to plaintiff's intake into
plaintiff's pipe line, this upon either the theory ( 1) that
the copper solutions were not water within the definition
to which the law of waters applies, but were instead an
artificial product of plaintiff's industry and expense,
originating as such in and upon plaintiff's personal
property and following a known and defined course and
natural channel down Dixon Gulch to plaintiff's intake
and thence into plaintiff's pipe lines to plaintiff's precipitating plant; or (2) that the copper solutions, although not water within the contemplation of the law,
for want of a better rule, were subject by analogy to
certain incidents of the law of waters wherein the fact
that both are liquid constitutes their only common attribute. And lest it might be held that because the copper solutions would flow down the natural channel of
Dixon Gulch, in that known and defined course, such
solutions would be subject to appropriation as water so
flowing initiated by filing in the office of the State
Engineer as provided by statute, plaintiff made such
a filing in the office of the State Engineer (Ex. 36)
at the time plaintiff began its deposits there and before
there were any copper solutions, plaintiff knowing then
that the solutions would be formed and that they would
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flow down the gulch just as experience has proved.
One would conclude the plaintiff had done a great
deal, but notwithstanding all that, the thought seemed
to be that plaintiff should have constructed a concrete
dam or some such structure across Dixon Gulch along
plaintiff's boundary line and there the solutions have
been collected and allowed to spill over such impediment
and flow on down the natural channel which under those
conditions would have been susceptible to condemnation,
the fact of its being a natural channel instead of an
artificial channel being of no importance under the
statute. The case would then be squarely within the
decision of this court in Utah Copper Co. v. MontanaBingham Con. Mng. Co. In the first place, as we have
already noted, the construction of such a dam must of
necessity extend not only across Dixon Gulch but up
through the railroad fill to its very surface, because
the copper solutions in their course down the gulch
flow, seep and percolate laterally through the dump
and railroad fill, and the railroad fill at that point attains a depth from surface to the bottom of the gulch
of 108 feet. (See photostat inserted at page 32). Not
only would the initial cost of such a structure be prohibitive, but it would be utterly incapable of maintenance at any cost. The dumps and railroad fill are
masses of loose material. A concrete dam was found
necessary at the toe of the railroad fill long before
the dumps were made above in order, temporarily at
27

least, to hold back the fill material and prevent its
working on down that precipitous gulch. As explained
by Mr. Goodrich and Mr. Earl, such a diversion facility
in that material could not long exist because the pressure lateraly imposed would soon warp, twist, distort
and crush it. Moreover, the plaintiff had no such right
in or through the railroad fill, nor could such right be
condemned, endangering as it obviously would the stability of the fill and creating an impediment to the conduct of the railroad operation generally. And what a
useless thing to do !
And the question was asked if an irrigator would
have a similar right, the illustration being that A was
the owner of a tract of land in which true percolating
waters had their source; that immediately below A's
tract was another owned by B into which the percolating waters from A's land seeped naturally forming a
bog upon a part of B 's tract, from which B was engaged in the pumping of the water so collected there up
to and upon B 's higher land for the irrigation of the
latter; that lying immediately below B 's tract was another owned by A, and that A conceived the plan of
condemning an easement across B 's tract in its natural
state for the conveyance of the percolating water so
originating in A's upper tract. The question was, would
A have the right to condemn such an easement across
B 's land for that purpose? If the plaintiff's copper
solutions are to be defined as true percolating water,
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the question was a fair one, and the same rule should
be applied to all persons regardless of the use to which
such true percolating waters are to be applied.
Of course A would have the right to construct a
dam along his boundary, collect on A's property the percolating waters so impounded, and then condemn a ditch
across B 's tract for the conveyance of the waters so
collected for the irrigation of A's lower tract. Whether
or not as an incident to A's appropriation the bog
upon B 's tract was dried up, B 's pumps were put out
of commission and B 's tract rendered worthless, would
be damnum absque in juria, would be an incident of no
interest to anyone because B had no right to the continued percolation of the percolating water making in
A's land. The question assumes that all the water
in the bog on B 's tract had its origin in A's upper tract
as true percolating water; that neither reasonable use
nor correlative right doctrines applied and that there
was no known or defined channel, and that there would
be no issue raised as to the necessity under such circumstances of condemning an area of unreasonable extent, then we are aware of no reason under those facts
why A might not condemn an easement across B 's tract
for the conveyance of percolating waters originating in
A's upper tract for the irrigation of A's lower tract.
The decisions of this court and of all others, whatever
may be the language used, are to the effect that percolating water arising upon A's premises is A's property.
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It is not necessary that A do anything to make such
true percolating water his property while upon his premIses.

See Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights, 2d

od., Vol. 2, § 1189, p. 2153, as follows:
The English rule is that all percolating waters are considered a part of the soil where
found, and, therefore belong absolutely to the
owner thereof. * * * This rule of the common law as to all percolating waters was generally adopted by the various States and Territories of this country, both East and West; * * *
And in all jurisdictions, at the present time,
what are considered mere diffused percolations
come within the common law rule as stated above.
Even the Western States which distinguish those
percolating waters which are the source of supply to other waters, from diffused percolations,
apply the common law rule to diffused percolations and that, too, since the modern classification was made, which originated with the case
of Katz v. Walkinshaw.
and such is the clearly announced rule in this jurisdiction. See for instance Willow Creek Irr. Co. v. Michaelson, 21 Utah 248, 60 Pac. 943, 51 L. R. A. 280, 81 Am.
St. Rep. 687, wherein this court held:
Water intermingling with the ground, or
flowing through it by filtration or percolation,
or by chemical attraction, is but a component
part of the earth, and has no characteristic of
ownership distinct from the land itself. In the
eye of the law, water so commingled and flowing,
or motionless, underneath the surface, is not the
subject of ownership apart and distinct from the
soil.
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Should A permit such water to leave his estate
he would lose title to it, but, as in the case at bar, such
water would never leave his estate if he first condemned
an easement for the conveyance of it, and under the
statutes of this state whether the easement be for a
facility that is natural or artificial is of no importance.
This court of course correctly held in Utah Copper Co.
v. Montana-Bingham Con. Mng. Co. that an easement
for the removal of a dump by implication included the
removal of the copper solutions made by the process
now familiar to us, and the fact that those solutions
seeped through the dump and into the natural soil beneath on down to bedrock and thence down the gulch
through the natural soil and on bedrock beneath the
dump, as well as through the dump itself, on an easement for the removal of the dump, did not divest Utah
Copper Company from its title to such solutions. Such
was the opinion also of the District Court of the United
States for the District of Utah. A specific easement
condemned in the case at bar must accomplish the same
purpose. As aptly said in Simmons v. Winters, 21
Ore. 35, 28 Am. St. Rep. 727, 27 Pac. 7:
As there must be an actual diversion of the
water from its natural channel by means of a
ditch or other structure to effect the appropriation, any dry ravine, gulch, or hollow in lands
may be used for this purpose as a part of the
ditch for conducting the water. Not only may
these be used by the appropriator as a parr
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of his ditch, but he may use the lower portion
of the same bed or natural channel from which
the water is taken. Porn. Rip. Rights, § 48. * * *
The maxim of the law is that whoever grants
a thing is supposed also, tacitly, to grant that
without which the grant would be of no avail.
Where the principal thing is granted, the incident shall pass. Oo. Litt. 152a. A grant of real
estate will include whatever the grantor has
power to convey which is reasonably necessary
to the enjoyment of the thing granted. 3 Washb.
Real Prop. *627. * * *
A contrary ruling would be too monstrous and
absurd to be sanctioned by judicial authority.
II
Point
The so-called Hays Spring is not upon or within the
property or estate of the defendants, but issues from and
out of the railway fill which is the property and estate of
the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company, and of which
at the time of their issuance those solutions are a part, whatever the course they may have pursued to their point of issuance. For that reason, if for no other, defendants neither
have now nor ever have had any right, title or interest in
or to the waters of the so-called Hays Spring.

Immediately adjoining the mining claims of the
plaintiff in Dixon Gulch to the east is Valentine Scrip
owned by the defendant Stephen Hays Estate, Inc.
(Finding of Fact VII, Abs. 600).

The Bingham & Gar-

field Railway fill is for the most part on the property
of plaintiff (Exhibit 12 and VI, photo Exhibit 19 inserted in Respondent's Brief, p. 12).

We will here

insert a drawing prepared from Exhibit VI which ac-

32

c ?'c£'~,i sc5''\'

\.._(5''\.

' \Y'f"~

, \0.\'i-- C

~ ~'r:\....X--~""\\\-

c\

ij0\\\-,,\0.\ '\

u.o'~,,~'' ,,
~<;:.3o

,.

u.,_,,

YJo

<'-<"

...- c;.'C .o.;../' , .

'-'~C'

"'s·
c /9sci~,
0 _,..... ..o
....r-cr <J.e/
~

!:>..,{

'

\

. .3.S --'?

'

~7s<'"' •
'"·~.-,__,'

<

_.....,_

s.,,. G

\\

:>I'

',

£~

<'

', '~oY,.,,·
'

'"'G.

~5'£.___;-----

Cl.~~~

r-1· 0

~~

_...v~

S:.c e'
·4'"-"

\

~·.i;,-

. 5'< e

' .-3'"" 64=<'?

\

,z5 "-

"'

~

<'<"o

___..

.,
,.

--~,~.
··~

:<?""
~--

0

!

~A-c"1"'

"1"'~ 1. 01 ac.res
' \ \____ ------------------ -c_ -----------'

"'o

0

\;_

,

__

\\-.
\

~""-'z_~~~

'_::.....-

·'J~~

>oV

s. ;sD4-/2' w.

.....----

INFO~M~~

M

Jli

ION
FRO
I 8 DERIVED
IT

curately delineates Tracts B, C and D, the easterly
boundary line of plaintiff's property across Dixon
Gulch, which is the westerly boundary of the defendants' Valentine Scrip, and supplies other information,
including certain dimensions and distances for which
we were asked during the oral argument but were unable
to ,supply with precision. The Railway Company's interest in and upon Tract D is that of an easement for
railroad purposes, more particularly defined by Exhibits 4 and 5 and Findings of Fact Nos. VIII and X
and illustrated upon Exhibit VI. Pursuant to those
easements the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company
dumped or caused to be dumped into Dixon Gulch, partially upon Tract D, 175;644 cubic yards of material
(Tr. 654, Ex. 39) whereby to construct the fill over
which the Railway Company's equipment is operated
across Dixon Gulch.

Of that material, in all 175,644

cubic yards, 46,924 cubic yards of quartzite was obtained from the adjoining cut on the north side of Dixon
Gulch, and 128,720 cubic yards of porphyry rock or low
grade copper ore or overburden was obtained from the
plaintiff's mine, the latter material being generally of
the same character as that constituting plaintiff's dumps
in Dixon Gulch westerly of the railroad fill. (Tr. 655)
Exhibit VI supplies the following detail concerning the
railway fill in Dixon Gulch:
Total area covered by filL___ _____________________ 3.21 acres
Total area on Valentine Scrip _________________ 1.43 acres
33

Total area on plaintiff's property ........... 1.78 acres
Total quantity of material
deposted ................................................. 175,644 cu. yds.
Quantity of material on Valentine
Scrip .........................................58i360 cu. yds. or 1/3
Two-thirds of the railroad fill rests upon the Argonaut
No. 1 Placer Mining Claim, U. S. Lot No. 302, of which
plaintiff is the owner, as will more particularly appear
from the certified copy of conveyance to plaintiff introduced in evidence as Exhibit 12.
By instrument dated April 30, 1928, (Exhibit 11)
Bingham & Garfield Railway Company gave its consent
that Utah Copper Company might-

* * * enter upon said premises and use
as a conduit for the conveyance of water and copper and any and all other solutions and minerals
any part or the whole, of said premises. And
Railway Company does hereby consent, in so far
as any rights or easement owned or possessed by
it over, upon, in, beneath or through the said
premises are concerned, that Copper Company
may enter upon and do or cause to be done any
and all acts and things that will not at any time
interfere with the proper use and enjoyment of
said premises by Railway Company.
Defendants have asserted in their brief that the
court below concluded that the railway fill was a part
of the realty upon which it was situated, and hence was
the property of the defendants.

Were the defendants

correct in that contention, no more than one-third of
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the railway fill could attach to their property, because
the remaining two-thirds lies upon plaintiff's property.
But the court below did not so conclude. After finding
the facts with relation to the acquisition of the Railway
Company's easements and the construction of the fill
for the operation of the Railway Company's facilities
across Dixon Gulch (Findings of Fact No. VIII and X,
.AJbs. 601, 602) the court concluded as follows ('ConclusIOn

of Law IV, Abs. 626):
Bingham & Garfield Railway Company was
at all times with which this cause is concerned
and now is the owner of said railroad fill in the
sense that said Railway Company may remove
the fill or a part of it if its removal be in furtherance of its railway operations and pursuant to
and within the limits of the order of condemnation and conveyances by which the Railway Company's right of occupation is defined. But the
Railway Company does not retain title to the fill
in the sense that it has all of the incidents of title
thereto and the Railway Company does not have
the right to capture vagrant waters therein.
The court neither found nor concluded as stated on

page 48 of Appellants' Reply Brief that "the fill to
belong to defendants so far as the right to capture the
water thereon is concerned.'' On the contrary, the
court both found and concluded that the defendant had
no right at all to capture the copper solutions or waters
with which this case is concerned.

The easements in

the Railway Company are not broad enough to include
the conveyance of copper solutions from plaintiff's
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dumps above into plaintiff's intake on Tract C to accomplish the leaching and precipitation of plaintiff's
ores. Wherefore plaintiff ins,tituted this suit to acquire that easement by condemnation. The Railway
Company was not a party to this suit. We presume no
one would contend that the Railway Company's buildings, tracks, rails and ties could not be removed by
the Railway Company at its pleasure, and no more
could the Railway Company be deprived of the right to
remove the railway fill if for any reason its removal
were desired by the Railway Company.
Counsel made the same contention in the court below
and in support thereof cited two cases that hold directly against them, and those cases are sufficient for our
purpose here. We refer toVan Husan v. Omaha Bridge & Terminal Ry.
Co., 118 Ia. 366, 92 N. W. 47.
Omaha Bridge & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Whitney 68 Nebr. 389, 99 N. W. 525.
Omaha Bridge & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Whitney, 68
Nebr. 389, 99 N. W. 525, was a suit to condemn for a
railroad right of way certain lands upon which had
theretofore been constructed an embankment of earth
for a roadbed, and ties and tracks had been laid over
it, thus making a completed railroad track. The roadbed had been constructed years before by the Union
Pacific Railway Company under an agreement with a
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land company for the purpose of furnishing trackage
facilities in that vicini,ty. In the condemnation suit
the question was as to the ownership of the roadbed
theretofore constructed by the Union Pacific Railway
Company and as to whether or not the condemner should
be required to pay the value of the land sought to be
condemned as enhanced by the railroad construction
already there. It was contended by the defendants that
the Union Pacific Railway Company had conveyed to
the defendants' grantor not only the land upon which
the enbankment and roadbed had been constructed, but
the roadbed as well, and that the condemner accordingly
must pay for the property taken, which included the
roadbed, and the court held that :by reason of that conveyance by the Railway Company to the defendant the
latter had :become the owner of the roadbed or fill, continuing in part as follows:

* * * The rule, no doubt, is that a railroad company, when it enters upon the land of
another, constructs a roadbed, and places its
ties and rails thereon, and occupied the land for
right of way purposes, has created property
which would inure to the benefit of and belong
to the company thus constructing it, or to its
grantees, and a landowner could not, in condemnation proceedings, have the value of such work
and improvement included in his award.
And in Van Husan v. Omaha Bridge & T. Ry. Co.,
118 Ia. 366, 92 N. W. 47, the court held:
There is no doubt of the general rule, re-
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lied upon by appellee, that one may erect improvements on the land of another which do not
become a part of the real estate; and, were it
not for the deed made by the Union Pacific Company, we would be inclined to agree with them
in their conclusion that this embankment belonged to the Union Pacific Company, or its grantees,
and that plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation therefor; but in the face of this solemn instrument it does not lie in the mouth of that
company or its grantees to say that it had no
title to the lands, and, therefore, that the improvements thereon did not pass by the deed.
When a railroad company enters upon the land of
another, builds a roadbed, places ties and rails
thereon, they, as a general rule, in the absence
of abandonment to the owner, belong to the comparty constructing the same, or to its grantees or
assignees, and the landowner cannot, in condemnation proceedings, have the value thereof included in his award. This is famil,iar doctrine
requiring no support from the authoritives.
* * *Doubtless, as between the Union Pacific
Company and Street and the Nebraska Ferry
Company, the embankment, and especially the
ties and rails, was, before the execution of the
deed, personal property, and might be said to be
a trade fixture, under the doctrine announced in
Railroad Co. v. Nyce, 61 Kan. 394, 59 Pac. 1040,
48 L. R. A. 241, and Justice v. Railroad Co., 87
Pa. 28. * * *
With relation to the two cases cited in the above
quotation, in that of Railroad Co. v. Nyce will be found
the following in paragraph 4 of the syllabus:
4.

Improvements placed upon real estate
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by a railroad company, necessary to the operation of the road, are to be regarded as trade
fixtures, and not accessories of the land to which
they are attached.
The second of the two cases so cited, that of Justice v. Railroad Co., 87 Pa. St. Rep. 28, was decided
in the year 1878 and clearly enough announces the rule
for which plaintiff contends in the case at bar.

That

case had to do with the railroad company that constructed a part of its road as a trespasser upon lands
wherein it had no title or interest of any kind. The
court held that the owner of the fee did not thereby
become the owner of the railroad facilities, saying in
part:

* * * A railroad company can take no
free-hold title, and when its proper use of the
easement ceases, the franchise is at an end.
There is no intention in fact to attach the structure to the freehold. We have therefore these
salient features to characterize the case before
us, to wit: the right to enter on the land under
authority of law, to build a railroad for public
use; the acquisition thereby of a mere easement
in the land; the entire absence of an intention to
dedicate the chattels entering into its construction to the use of the land; the necessity for their
use in the execution of the public purpose; and,
lastly, the power to retain and possess these chattels and the structures they compose, by a valid
proceeding at law, nothwithstanding the original
illegality of the entry. * * *
There are some analogies bearing remotely
on the question before us, showing that property

39

is not gained by the owner of land because found
upon it. Thus, in the case of property carried
off by a flood and stranded on the premises
·of another, the owner may follow it, enter and
take it, or if the owner of the land convert it may
recover its value: * * *
The court below was aware of the foregoing decisions when making its conclusion of law No. IV hereinbefore set out in full, and instead of concluding that the
defendants were the owners of that part of the railway
fill that is upon lands whereof the defendants are the
owners in fee subject to the railway easements, finds
that the Railway Company "was at all times with which
this case is concerned and now is the owner of the railroad fill in the sense that the Railway Company may
remove the fill or a part of it, etc.'' While we do not
approve of any limitations whatever upon the Railway Company's title to its fill, and deny that there is
any authority whatever by which a limitation could be
imposed under the facts of this case wherein no intention to abandon appears, we did not assign error in
the face of a judgment and final order in all respects
in our favor. Had we assigned error upon the court's
refusal to admit the water application, Exhibit 36, and
as well upon all other rulings to which we excepted, we
would have become a burden to the court rather than
of the assistance we have the presumption to hope we
are rendering.
Conclusion of Law No. IV
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IS

to the .effect that the

Railway Company is the owner of the fill and has the
right to remove it, hence under thl:l rule announced by
Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Con. Mng. Oo.,-

* * * the waters carrying copper or otherminerals in solution, so long as they are in the
dump and thus a part of it, and before they leave
it and percolate through the soil and earth on
the claim or claims of the defendant not conveyed to the plaintiff, are, like the dump itself, the
property of the plaintiff; * * * (255 Pac.
672)
Every drop of water taken into plaintiff's intake
from the so-called Hays Spring came and now comes
to the surface out of the railroad fill. (Tr. 219, 301,
333, 1866) At plaintiff's intake all the material on and
wbove bedrock was from, and constitutes a part of the
railroad fill. Upon this subject Mr. Earl testified as
follows:

* * * In the driving of the tunnel there
was no water encountered. After the raise was
made up to the railroad fill some water went
down into the tunnel. The tunnel was dry during
the entire period of time that we were excavating
until we raised. * * * It was dry ground. It
was dusty when they drilled it; * • * Wben
we raised and went up to the surface we got
quite a little water. Wben I went up in the morning, the night shift had broken through the solid
rock and when I went up there in the morning,
about half past seven in the morning (Tr. 105)
there was a little water dripping down and at
that time they were excavating up into-under-
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neath the concrete walls, about 2 or 3 feet above
bedrock. * * * They encountered water above
bedrock. It percolated through the fill or soil,
whatever you want to call it; it is part of the
railroad fill. Everything above bedrock right in
the bottom of that gulch was railroad fill, every
bit of it. * * *
Mr. Earl located the Hays Spring as follows:

* * * I think I have already indicated it
on exhibit 6 as being about the point where the
figure 4 appears on that course N. 41 degrees 38
minutes west, 38 feet. The water at that point
comes out through the boulders of the rock wall
that is constructed there, that is a part of the fill.
With relation to the original bottom of Dixon
Gulch, that point is a little bit to the left, I
would say, the left hand side of it, 8 or 10 feet
and maybe 12 feet, higher elevation. It is probably-! wouldn't say positively, (Tr. 204) because I have not staked out the bottom of that
gulch, but I think it is about 15 feet to the left
of the original bottom of the gulch.

* * *
* * * The fill at that point is seven to ten
feet deep. * * *
The defendants' geologist, Mr.

Crane, admitted

that (Tr. 1866) the point of issuance of the Hays Spring
was from and out of the railroad fill. See also the testimony of Mr. Goodrich (Tr. 301) as follows:

* * * The water comes to the surface
from a point marked '' Q'' in pencil in the bottom of the Dixon Gulch, just below the rock wall
shown on Exhibit 9. The water does not come
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out on bedrock at that point; it comes out of the
rock and other material in the bottom of Dixon
Gulch. That rock and material at that point is
six or eight feet deep above bedrock. The water
at that point comes out on top of that rock and
material and not on bedrock. This material is
not natural surface soil, the most of it has washed down from the railroad embankment; a part
of the railroad fill.

* * * •
* * * The spring that comes out below
the rock wall that we have been talking about in
the bottom of the gulch comes out on top of material in the bottom of the gulch, coming out
of the railroad fill. It does not come out of the
side of the hill. * • •
The railroad fill was constructed by the Bingham
& Garfield Railway Company for use in the operation
of its railroad; it is one of its facilities for that purpose.
This fill, constructed there pursuant to easements granted for that purpose, of course is and will until albandoned remain the property of the railway company. Pursuing defendants' theory, the copper solutions existing
in or percolating or flowing through or upon the fill,
would be a part of the fill, and like the fill itself, would
be the property of the railway company. As iboth the
trial court and the supreme court held in the case of
Utah Copper Company v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Company, supra, whatever the earlier
course taken by those solutions, so long as they are
within the railroad fill, defendants can have no interest
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m them.

Applying the law of percolating and surface

waters for which defendants so strongly contend, those
copper solutions on that theory would be a part of the
railway company's estate, and when they left defendants' estate (if they were ever upon it) title vested in
the railway company, and their present disposition would
be a matter 'between the railway company and the plaintiff wherein the defendants could be in no manner
concerned.
The fact that the Railway Company's easements
gave the Railway Company no power to conduct copper solutions from plaintiff's dumps over and across
Tract D for purposes of precipitation did not on that
account vest in the owner of the fee title to the copper '
solutions that were in fact within the Railway Company's property, the railway fill. Had the Railway
Company collected those solutions in vats or tanks on
Tract D for the purpose of precipitating the copper from
them, it would have exceeded the privileges embraced
within its easements, but the copper solutions in its facilities would not have become the property of the owner of
the fee. It could not be denied that had the copper solutions endangered the stability of the fill, the Railway
Company would have had the right within its easements
and without consulting the defendants to have collected
and disposed of the copper solutions in its fill or have arranged with another for their collection and disposition
for the protection of the fill, and that therein the defend-
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ants would have had neither right nor interest. It was contended in Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Con.
Mng. Co. that the dumping easement in Tiewaukee
Gulch was not broad enough to give the owner of the
dump the right to collect and dispose of the copper solutions making there, and that therefore the meteoric
waters flowing upon and collecting in the dump were
the property of the defendant owner of the fee, their
collection and disposition by the owner of the dump not
having been embraced within the grant by which the
easement was created, but this court held, as we have
already observed, that although the copper solutions or
waters were not mentioned in the grant, still, ownership of the dumps was ownership of all within them,
and that the copper solutions while in the dumps were
a part of the dumps and the property of the Utah Copper Company, which owned the dumps. The Hays
Spring, so-called emerges from and out of the railroad
fill by whatever course or courses the solutions arrived
at that destination, and title to such solutions while in
the fill could not be in the defendants. By its consent
the Railway Company surrendered to the plaintiff whatever claim or interest it had in or to those solutions.
They were not the property of the defendants.
Counsel take exception to our statement that the
occupation by the Bingham & Garfield Railway Company of the area across Dixon Gulch covered by its
easements is exclusive, and challenged us to cite any
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authority to that effect. We accordingly take this occasion to direct counsel's attention to the case of Hopkins v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 76 Minn. 70,
78 N. W. 969, wherein the court held:

* * * Our view of the law is that * * *
whatever may be the particular railroad purpose
giving rise to this necessity,-whether for right
of way, depot grounds, railroad yards, sites for
machine shops, elevators, etc., or for planting
trees or erecting screens to protect the road from
snow,-the railroad company is entitled to the exclusive possession of the land, unless otherwise
expressly provided in the order of the court, so
long as it sees fit to use it for the purposes for
which it was acquired; that it is for the railroad
company, and it alone, to determine when it deems
it necessary or proper to use the land for such
purposes, and when it takes possession the burden
is not on it to show that the manner of the use
is necessary. We fail to percieve any distinction
in principle in this respect between land acquired
for protection against snow, and land acquired
for right of way, or any of the other of the
numerous purposes for which railroad companies
may condemn. There are manifest reasons, founded on public policy and necessity, why the possession of land acquired for railroad purposes
should ordinarily be exclusively in the company,
and not concurrently in it and the former owner.

* * *
and to Olive v. Sabine & E. T. Ry. Co., 11 Tex. Civ. App.
208, 33 S. W. 139, wherein the court said:

* * * a conflict of opinion has arisen
among the courts as to the correlative rights of
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the owner of the fee and the owner of the right,
-some holding, as matter of law, that the nature
of the use of the right of way, essential in the
operation of a railway, is such as to necessitate
the entire possession and control of the soil, burdened with the right, and to exclude the owner
of the fee from any concurrent use or enjoyment
of it whatever; and others holding that, while the
right of the company is the paramount one, and
the owner cannot impede its full exercise, or put
the land to uses inconsistent with its full exercise,
still it is not of such a nature as to prevent the
use of the land by the owner for any purpose at
all. * * *
and then observe the ruling of this court in Bingham
& Garfield Ry. Co. v. North Utah Mining Co., 49 Utah
125, 162 Pac. 65, wherein this court held that-( quoting
paragraph 1 of the syllabus)
The use of land condemned for a railroad
right of way for an exclusive use permanent in
its nature precludes the owner from entering
on or using any part of it, except by the condemnor's consent, or where the statute or the
court limits the easement by reserving certain
rights to the owner.
The language in the judgment and final order of
condemnation (Exhibit 5) is that the plaintiff railway
company ''may exclusively occupy said premises.'' The
deed (Exhibit 4) defines the grant in a manner to permit of no other conclusion under the authorities than
that the railway company's occupation is exclusive.
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III
Point
By chemical analysis the copper solutions from the Bingham & Garfield Railway drain tunnel, the Bingham & Garfield Railway fill (Hays Spring) and the North or Copper Incline were shown to have a common source in plaintiff's
dumps above in Dixon Gulch.

Respondent's function is to reply to appellants'
case on this appeal. Appellants' effort to discredit
:B-,indings of Fact Nos. XXVIII to XXXV, both inclusive, (Abs. 619 to 624) relating to the source of the copper solutions with which we are here concerned and the
channel or course over which they flow, seep and percolate, has been so feeble, ever coupled with an apologetic
statement that it made no differnce anyway from whence
the solutions came or by what channel or course they
arrived, and coupled further with a refusal to discuss
the geologic case, that our argument upon those matters has been cursory merely because appellants' case
did not justify a more extended discussion. Accordingly the very important testimony of Beeson, Hanson,
Marsh and Martin has been barely referred to and their
several carefully performed experiments and graph exhibits to prove the source of these copper solutions have
been dwelt upon scarcely at all. We are confident that
the formal findings of a trial court are not to be set
aside 'bY the mere assertion that they are not supported
by the evidence and, of course, not to be set aside by
the mere statement that they are of no importance any
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way beoause by law appeUants' have succeeeded to the
ownership of the copper solutions whatever their origin
may have. been or by whatever course they may have arrived at their present destination. Because mentioned
so seldom counsel have the effrontery to state to this
court "that plaintif was none too proud of the evidence
of one of its so-called experts-Mr. Frederick D. Hanson." (Reply Brief for Appellants, p. 44.) We hope
this court will read the whole of Mr. Hanson's testimony. Plaintiff offered no expert in whose testimony
it takes a greater pride than that of Mr. Hanson, nor
for whose ability ,and integrity plaintiff has a greater
respect. None of plaintiff's witnesses, either expert or
lay, were "bought or paid for." They were not the type
of men who could have been bought or paid for. We
are surprised that the testimony of the defendants'
witness Mr. Shelton was even mentioned by defendants'
counsel. That kind ·of talk may be argument in the
opinion of counsel, but it is not within our definition
of it and merits little comment.
While we were astonished at the testimony of some
of defendants' witnesses, it remained for counsel to explain that its experts had been "bought and paid for"
(Reply Brief for Appellants, p. 38). Counsel are
capable of frank admissioll!s. We have characterized
them as "audacious," but this is the first occasion
we have had to witness an admission in the briefs
of counsel that they had offered and vouched for
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the testimony of witnesses whom they had "bought
and paid for." Plaintiff's witnesses were not bought or
paid for.

Expert witnesses are not always dishonest.

Plaintiff offered its experts and vouched for their integrity and intellectual honesty. Both are best disclosed
by their testimony. Plaintiff invites comparisons upon
that basis.
With accustomed abandon counsel devote about half
a paragraph, on page 53 of the Reply Brief for Appellants, to the statement that by chemical analysis the
copper solutions at the Hays Spring (Bingham & Garfield Railway fill), the drain tunnel and the north or
copper incline were proved to have come from different
sources. If true, that fact would be worthy of elaboration and development. Of course the statement is not
true and the court's findings upon that subject (Findings of Fact XXXI and XXXIII, Abs. 620, 621) are
abundantly supported by the evidence.
Harold S. Martin was a metallurgical engineer m
plaintiff's employ and as such in charge of plaintiff's
research and analytical laboratories and of plain tiff's
experimental and research work on flotation and ore
tracing, including processes employed in the leaching of
plaintiff's dumps and the production and treatment of
the copper solutions so obtained. Mr. Martin described
in detail the leaching processes as applied to plaintiff's
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dumps, the time element involved, etc. (Tr. 470, et seq),
and upon being recalled (Tr. 1988 et seq) testified to
his study of water analyses by Messrs. Black & Deason,
Herman Harms and Dr. Thomas B. Brighton, which
analyses were made of water samples taken by vanous
persons over a period of several months.
Mr. Martin reduced the analyses to graphic form
by his Chart, Plaintiff's Ex. 77, platting upon that
exhibit the results of the several analyses in the same
manner as those analyses were reported by the chemists
making them, i. e., in milligrams per liter (Tr. 1990).
Defendants illustrated the result·s of these analyses,
or certain of them, by graphs prepared on a different
basis in order to magnify slight differences m ummportant details (Exhibits 68 and 125). Mr. Martin's
testimony upon his chart, Exhibit 77, his comparisons
and conclusion, will ·be found in the transcript from
page 1988 to 2022.

He testified in part as follows:

From my study of these analyses, as to
whether or not these waters came from the same
·source or had traveled substantially the same
channel,-! would say from these analyses that
the first three waters, (Tr. 1995) the B. & G.
drain tunnel water, the B. & G. fill water and
the north incline water must have come either
from the same or very simi1ar sources because
they contain all of these elements in substantially
the same amount.
As to each determination, and the variations
in each and how they reflect upon the identity
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of these waters- * * * The difference in
the analyses by the different chemists are as
great and in some c1ases greater than the difference in the water samples by the same chemists.
(Tr. 1996) * * * So that I do not consider
these vari,ations in the position of solids in the
three wa,ters or in the sepaDate samples of the
three waters as indicative of a different origin.
* * * The copper determinations by the different chemists on different samples check almost exactly; that is an easy and accurate determination, so that there is not any argument
about the copper content showing any different
'SOurce.
The free ~sulphuric acid shows a wide variation between Mr. Harms and Dr. Brighton as
against Black & Deason's results. I think that
although Black & Deason's report indicates that
their determination was free acid, that it actually
was not free sulphuric acid, but total sulphric
acid, both combined and free, because the results
by Dr. Brighton and by Mr. Harms check very
closely in this respect, and so far below the other
determination that I doubt whether this means
free acid or not. The variation in each case is
very slight; there is shown by Mr. Harms' analyses a slight lowering of the free acid in the
Hays water or B. & G. fill water, and in the
north (Tr. 1998) incline water, but the difference
is very 'Small, and Dr. Brighton's report shows
the acidity of the B. & G. drain tunnel water and
the B. & G. fill water to be the same, so that
variation is not indicative; might be expected,
even though they flowed down the same channel.
The sulphur trioxide total 803, all the results check very closely and there is very little
variation in the results on the different samples
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of water; Black & Deason show less variation
·between the B. & G. drain tunnel water and the
B. & G. fill w,ater than does Mr. Harms; Dr.
Brighton is very close on those two waters, close
to Mr. Harms; and the two waters are close to
each other.
In the silica content of these waters there
is shown some variation. * * * Comparing
the B. & G. drain tunnel water with the fill water (Tr. 1999) in silica content, Mr. Harms shows
a very slight variation; Black & Dnason show the
variation noted on Exhibit No. 68, which was 30
parts per million. I do not consider that 30
parts per million in this silica content carries
any weight as to the source or origin of the
water or it·s course, because calculated into pounds
per day, it would only take one pound of silica a
day to increase that analysis of 4000 gallons of
water by that amount; I think it perfectly possible that the waters could absorb such varying
quantities of silica.
In the case of iron oxide, all three chemisrts
show les'S iron oxide in the B. & G. fill water
than in the B. & G. drain tunnel water, but not
enough less to indicate a different source to me;
in each case the difference is slight; they are all
pretty good checks.
Aluminum oxide checks very closely in the two
waters, the B. & U. drain tunnel and the B. & G.
fill water, and drops down somewhat according
to Black & Deason's analysis, in the north incline water. * * *
Coming to the lime, all the chemists agreed
pretty closely on the lime content of these waters, each one showing that the B. & G. fill water
contains a slightly greater amount of lime than
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the B. & G. drain tunnel water. (Tr. 2000)
And as I understand with the silica, even with
this difference in lime showing by Black & Deason that I believe i's something like 70 parts per
million, which only means about 2.33 pounds of
lime to be absorbed by 4000 gallons of water per
day of 24 hours. So that to me that doesn't indicate any more variation, something that you
might expect from time to time by slightly different courses of the water. The magnesia is not a
very good check as between the chemists, but the
variation between the different samples of water, ~speaking of the first three, is no more in any
ease and very close in most cases, and show the
same reading as compared with the chlorine on
the Black & Deason determination. On the north
incline the water shows about 70 or 80 parts per
million more chlorine than the other two waters.
I have not paid any attention to that difference
in chlorine because the other chemists do not
coincide with that increase of chlorine in the
north incline waters. So with sodium oxide, the
chemists agree except on the north incline water
where Mr. Harms shows a great deal larger
amount of sodium oxide than Black & Deason
shows and1that determination was not made by Dr.
Brighton.
Mr. Harms may be able to explain that increase in sodium oxide in that sample which he
ran. I won't attempt to do it. So that in every
case these element's were present in all these
three waters, the first three waters in subtsantially (Tr. 2001) the same amount and I would
not expect if that water were from the same
source, I would not expect any closer check than
that between chemists. * * * The water from
the south incline is obviously different. It con-
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tains a comparatively very small amount of total
solids and practically no copper, not more than
a trace of free-sulphuric acid and with all the
other constituents very little in amount, but it is
obviously from an entirely different source than
the first three. (Tr. 2002) * * *
~Most of my time since 1915 has been in the
metallurgical department except six months'
period when I was general foreman at the leaching plant of the Utah Copper Company. That
wws in 1920, from July to December. In the
course of my employment in the metallurgical department I have made many analyses of the
copper waters from the Utah Copper Company's
various dumps. (Tr. 2004) I have no records of
analyses of the waters from Dixon Gulch. With
relation to the waters from the other dumps of
the Utah Copper Company, I have observed
generally decided variation from day to day in
the same water of its various constituents. (Tr.
2005) * * *

Those analyses were only run for iron and
copper. Within a period of 24 hours and sometimes 48 hours these waters show a variation
of 100 milligrams per liter in copper and iron
oontent. * * * *
As to the waters of the B. &. G. drain tunnel, the B. &. G. fill and the north incline, from
the data appearing on Exhibit 77, I should say
that they are undoubtedly all from the same
source, they are typical of the waters from the
Utah Copper dump. * * * (Tr. 2008)
Cross Examination

I have not assumed any course for the waters
m the north incline; I haven't made a study of
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that part of the situation. I said on the chemical
analysis of the three waters any chemist after
having analyzed them would say they were from
the s~ame ~source, particularly the first two. As
to whether I would have to have some method
of ~accounting for some of the variances in order
to express an opinion with reference to the north
incline waters,-it would only have to stand in
contact with rock a little {Tr. 2012) longer than
the other waters to cause those changes; I don't
see any very great changes there. The lime
content of the north incline water would be perfectly natur,al if that water had stood practically
stagnant in contact with material containing lime,
-almost any rock; lime is present in all water;
the longer it stands in contact with most any
rock, although some contain more lime than
others, the more lime it will pick up. It might
:be that the lime content in the north incline waters is greater because of its having stood; or
it might be if it flowed or happened to flow
through material containing more lime or flowed
through slower, so it had a longer contact period.
I would simply say the lime alone showed some
'Slight variation, but that all the rest of the elements there in such similar quantities the lime
doesn't influence my opinion very much. ( Tr.
2013) * * * It would take in my opinion a
very short time to have picked up that much
lime, particularly since the water is acid and
calcium carbonate or limestone is very readily
soluble in dilute acid. (Tr. 2016) * * * The
solubility of lime is greatly increased due to the
acid character of the water. This water being of
the character that it is would be more inclined to
pick up lime than about anything that it would
touch. I wouldn't expect it to just about carry
its burden when it left the Utah Copper dump.
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(Tr. 2020) Practically all of the lime that exists
in the Utah Copper area is in the form of silica
which gMdually goes into solution but not so readily. * * * Those dumps are not homegeneous
through their entire width and breadth. Rocks
in the Utah Copper mine vary over wide ranges
in character as it comes to us at the mills and I
suppose it does as it goes into the dump. You
can probably find great variations between one
point and another in the dump, there is no doubt
about that. * * * (Tr. 2021)
Referring to the silica assay here, * • •
the analyses by all three chemists show an increase in the fill waters in silica, in samples
taken at various times. I would account for that
by simply saying that it might gather from the
fill. ( Tr. 2022) * * * I think the fill could
readily account for the increase in silica, or possibly those two waters never did have the same
silica composition. In my opinion the B. & G.
fill could easily account for the difference. (Tr.
2027) You wouldn't have to have any knowledge
of the character of the fill to express such an
opinion; all rocks contain silica, whether they run
from quartzite to porphyry, they are all silicious.
Some react more readily than others to various
agencies. That quantity of water with suffieient
time would dissolve that quantity of silica from
almost any rock. In my estimation eight hours
would be sufficient time. It is perfectly obvious,
when you see that water coming out of rock, that
it flows at least through and over a great many
rocks through that fill. (Tr. 2028) * * * I
think it pussible for me to render a judgment that
their source is the same, because all those elements check within reasona;ble limits. (Tr. 2029)
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Mr. Herman Harms was asked to make a similar
5tudy and to state his conclusion as to the source of
those waters.

Mr. Harms testified in part as follows:

Referring to Mr. Martin's exhibit 77, I
have compared the results here and I might state,
broadly speaking, that the three analyses made by
different (Tr. 2032) chemists under unknown
conditions, with the character of the water in
que stion, which was a most unusual one in that
same contained first an enormous amount of
solids, and second is of a decided acid character,
and third contained an unusually large amount of
copper, iron and alumina, and furthermore the
iron which is present in both the ferrous and the
ferric state which is constantly changing the
composition of the water in question, that the
result as a whole agrees very s'atisfactorily notably the actual constituents of the water. (Tr.
2033) * * * Considering * * * that the
chemists did not work under identical conditions
with the same character of apparatus, the amount
of water taken for the analysis, and furthermore
the degree of heat applied in drying the residue
which is known as total solids, I am rather surpri>s~ed that these results on the total solids check
as closely as they did ~and as reported by the
three chemists in question. On the other hand it
will be seen that eliminating the total solids the
results of these other constituents check very
satisf'actorily. In fact the copper checks sufficiently close. The sulphuric acid also checks very
closely with the exception of Black and Deason
who evidently used an entirely different method
for obtaining sulphuric acid (Tr. 2034) and evidently calculated their results upon the alkali
consuming qualities of the water in question, and
1
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not the actual free sulphuric acid which, by the
way again, is a very difficult determination to
make and subject to a great many errors unless
made under identical conditions in every way.
The sulphur trioxide on account of the enormous
amount present in the water I would say from
the chemist's standpoint checks very closely. The
same result I would say from all the * * *
other ingredients here, a very close check, the
differences in most instances are due to the
method of manipulation of the individual chemists.
The silica I note in the Harms analysis
here in one instance has increased considerably.
Now in this particular sample the water was
cloudy and all of the silica was included that was
both in solution and suspension, and again I
consider silica a substance that is insoluble in
acid. Now another chemist would probably say
silica is aboslutely 810 2, a substance that
would be dissolved by alkali and reprecipitated
by acid. So there again is an opening for diversion of results. The iron oxide, the alumina
and the lime in my opinion check extremely closely, which is equally true of magnesia, chlorine
and sodium oxide. (Tr. 2035) * * *
I might state in fairness to the three chemists in question as well as to the defendant and
the plaintiff, that from a scientific standpoint
these analyses should have been carried by the
three chemists side by side under identical conditions, using the same character of apparatus
and particularly the same method of analysis.
Now in a number of these instances different
me,thods carried out would invariably produce
different results notably in the character of this
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water which is subject to all forms of error on
account of its chamcteristic composition.
On the other hand there are certain ingredients (Tr. 2036) here which can be checked up
closely, not ably the copper and no doubt in these
instances the method was identical for the three
chemists and the results have been that the copper checks extremely close of the three chemists
in the different samples of water, and as I say
taking i·t as a whole, broadly speaking, the results represented here upon this chart by three
different chemists working unknown to one another, using different methods in analysis that
the results check extremely satisfactory. The
solids, if gentle ignition has been used and all of
the water crystallization been driven off, giving
just the actual mineral solids as represented by
the copper and any other individual element
would pro:bably check extremely close by adding
these various ingredients.
1

'Tiaking up each element by itself and considering the variation wherever it may appear, if
any, between the waters of the B. & G. drain tunnel, the B. & G. fill and the Prospect Tunnel No.
2, the north incline, the first three waters in
the column, those waters show the same similar
character and in my opinion have percolated
through ground or rock presenting the same
general character in its areas. ( Tr. 2037) * • *
As to the fourth water, the Prospect Tunnel
No. 1, the south incline, that is entirely differ·ent
and evidently had traversed through an entirely
different character of ground than the other two
samples in question. (Tr. 2038)
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Cross Examination

The fourth sample here, this one shows a
very small amount of solids and practically no
copper and only a tr'ace of sulphuric acid and a
relatively small amount of sulphur trioxide; that
is the south incline water. I regret that I have
absolutely no knowledge or any information regarding the character of the water or the general
conditions in connection with this case and in fact
no information has been furnished me whatever,
merely a request that an analysis be made and
that was even ordered without particularly specifying the purpose. I have no information or any
knowledge of anything pertaining to the general
conditions of the waters in question. (Tr. 2039)
1Considering the various elements affecting
the analyses I have mentioned, I say that the
differences between those waters are not material. The total solids, for example, in the particular I have explained, is no doubt due to the
water Wat has been retained upon drying. I
think from a chemist's standpoint, considering the
sources and character of the water, which is most
unusual and exceptional, that the results presented
there check very closely. If I were to assume
th'at the samples of water were all taken at the
same time, on the same day, I would certainly
expect to find those variances by three different
chemists, particularly when no definite me,thod
has been sbted, or definite course to be followed
by different chemists in question. (Tr. 2040)

*

*

*

It is my opm10n this water changes very
rapidly from day to day, and is never constant;
every twenty-four hours is certain variation.
(Tr. 2041)
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Mr. Martin and Mr. Harms wel'e the only chemists
called. The defendants' witness Mr. Orane, a mining
geologist, concluded because of the differ.ence in silica
content of the solutions from the copper or north incline, as shown by the Harms' analysis, that those water
must have come from a different source, but the explanation of that result given by Mr. Harms and Mr.
Martin also, disposed of that conclusion. Mr. Crane
was not qualified to testify upon that subject. The
testimony of the chemists, as had the testimony of the
geologists and engineers upon other subjects, corroborated the perfectly obvious f,act that the copper solutions in plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch were following
the course from plaintiff's dumps to plaintiff's intake
on Tract C the law of gravity compelled, viz., down that
precipitous gulch, seeping, percolating and flowing
through the dumps to their present outlet from the drain
tunnel and through the railroad fill to their present
outlet in the Hays Spring.

IV
Point
It is absolutely certain that unless the copper solutions
in plaintiff's dump are actually captured and controlled in the
dump they will percolate, seep and flow into Tract D. Reply Brief for AppeUants, page 88.

The .statement cont1ained in the point heading runs
parallel with the following at page 53 of the Reply Brief
for Appellants, "We will * * * simply ask this
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appellate court to disregard these arguments upon disputed facts with reference to the geology and decide
the questions of law presented by the appeal.'' The
point heading is followed immediately by this:
This certainty is a property right in the
owner of Tract D. This right in the owner of
Tract D is not an absolute right and may be
cut off and destroyed by the plaintiff capturing
,and controlling the solutions before they leave
the dump.
It is impossible to reconcile such statements with the
scores of pages of appelants' briefs devoted to a halfhearted apologetic denial of the very fact now so positively asserted.
So, the defendants have rubandoned their case on the
facts abandoned their assignment of error as to the
source of ,the copper solutions, the se1aling of tho westerly
'Slope of ,the railway fill and its function as a "perfect
hydraulic dam," admitting that the copper solutions have
their source in plaintiff's dumps in Dixon Gulch and that
the course pursued by those solutions was that supplied by
Dixon Gulch on and above bedrock across Tract D to
plaintiff's intake in Tract 0, a ,course that is known and
defined. Defendants have abandoned their assignment of
error against the finding that all the copper solutions
flowing at the Hays Spring pursue that known and defined course from that source than which there is none
other. Defendants have rested their case solely upon
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their contention upon the law stated at pages 88 and 89
predicated upon the assertion that defendants had a right
of some sort to a continued flow of the copper solutions
from plaintiff's dumps, the artifical product of plaintiff's industry and investment, and that if it were impossible for plaintiff to erect a barrier on plaintiff's
property line by which to intercept its solutions at that
point, then the plaintiff wras without relief, it could not
pursue its copper solutions, however valuable they might
be, for defendants by operation of law had become their
owner, the statutes of Utah affording plaintiff no
remedy by which to protect and preserve its title to
this valuable property plaintiff had created. That would
be a sad commentary upon the Eminent Domain statutes
of this state framed to aid mining generally as a public
use under the laws of this state.
Defendants' stat,ement indicates a surpnsmg conception of legal remedies to be lodged in the minds of
experienced counsel. To us the dissertation is just so
much nonsense. Defendants have no property right in
the continued flow of the copper solutions from plaintiff's dumps. There is nothing in that expectancy that
can be capitalized and sold. Plaintiff is not condemning
any such expectancy and plaintiff is not "mining the
defendants' ground.'' Plaintiff never was interested in
the copper solutions that were upon defendants' premises before plaintiff received its order for immediate
occupation on June 13, 1928-those solutions were over
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the wheel. Plaintiff instituted this suit and obtained
its order for immediate occupation for the purpose of
t1aking and preserving that part of its copper solutions
that had not yet reached the defendants' premises and
that is what plaintiff has done.

If an effectual barrier

could be constructed across Dixon Gulch on plaintiff's
property line the copper solutions in Tract D would
cease forthwith.
At the bottom of page 90 of the Reply Brief for
Appellants, the defendants inform us that we might
condemn land for the conduit desired that had not theretofore received copper solutions. No one is interested
in whether or not 'l_lract D had ever received copper
solutions.

Plaintiff's right to condemn does not de-

pend upon whether Tract D be wet or dry. Neither
plaintiff nor any one else ever was interested in the solutions thlat were molilentarily upon Tract D when the
order for immediate occupation was signed-there was
no lake or well upon Tract D the solutions in which
lake or well plaintiff seized upon the signing of the
order for immediate occupation. Tmct D never had
''any water producing capacity,'' a fact defendants not
only now admit but vigorously assert. It did not take
long for the copper solutions upon defendants' estate in
Tract D when the order was signed to pass over and
from that tract; the solutions yet to come were received
upon Tract D as upon a tract that had not yet received
such solutions; that "so far as copper solutions are
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concerned" it was "barren and non-productive."
Perhaps it is unfortunate that defendants have suffered the disappointment of being deprived of plaintiff's
copper solutions defendants had hoped would continue
to flow upon their property. Had defendants' land
not theretofore received copper solutions from plaintiff's dumps, then apparently, from defendants' discussion, defendants would concede that we had the right to
condemn becJause defendants would not then have been
disappointed.

Since when has one's disappointment

been the criterion by which the right to condemn has
been determined~ The argument is not worthy of reply.
Such a construction of the Eminent Domain statutes of
this State by which to continue in plaintiff the right to
condemn, upon the facts of this case, that its title and
ownership might rbe protected and preserved in the
valuable property plaintiff has created, would be without precedent in the conduct of judiciral functions anywhere, would shock the conscience of all who might
become cognizant of such a decision, while from the
point of view of its soundness in law would be inconsistent, illogical, ridiculous and absurd. Defendants'
argument merits no other characterization.
There is constantly repeated throughout appellants'
brief a statement that copper solutions and waters were
present upon Tract D before plaintiff's dumps in Dixon
Gulch were begun in 1926. We discussed a similar state66

ment, in respondent's brief under Point 3 at pages 59
to 64, and generally under Point A at pages 14 to 64.
Of course the rain falls and the snows collect upon the
railway fill and the trial court so found with unusual
meticulosity by its Finding No. XXXI (Abs. 620). However, the defendants are not interested in the meteoric
waters that fall upon the railway fill, nor are they interested in the copper solutions as waters-the defendants are not interested in wa,ter at all, they have said so
time and again, so why harp upon the presence of waters
in Dixon Gulch bfore the construction there of plaintiff's
dumps or the presence of the trace of copper in the waters placed there by the mine waste and overburden
dumped into Dixon Gulch in the construction of the railway fill7 The only apparent purpose is the remote
possibility that some confusion will be thus created in
the mind of the court th'at in some way will result favorably to defendants' contention.

Or perhaps, like coun-

sel's inquiry into the relationship, if any, between
plaintiff and the Bingham and Garfield Railway Company, this is another manifestation of counsel's sense of
humor.

v
Point
City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 Pac. 585.

IS

Pages 75 to 79 of the Reply Brief for Appellants
devoted to a discussion of the above case, wherein
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especial emphasis is placed upon the ruling of the court
that the owner of the land taken should be compensated
for such market value as it might possess by reason of
percolating waters within it not tributary to the natural
stream, counsel discussing that feature of the decision
as though it were an aid to their contention in the case
at bar. The Supreme Court of California held in that
case that the right of the City of Los Angeles in and to
the waters of the natural stream was paramount to the
riparian and all other rights of others upon the natural
stream and that the value of the land taken was subject
to this right of the City of Los Angeles. (57 Pac. 593).
The City of Los Angeles did not condemn the right it
already possessed and the value of that right was not
properly an element of value in the land condemned.
The court further held that if the City of Los Angeles
in order to supply its inhabitants with water found,

* * * itself compelled to encroach upon the
riparian rights of laud owners along the river
it ought to pay for those rights, the same as for
any other private property taken for a public
use. (57 Pac. 600).
and again at page 602:

* * * The point for the jury to determine was
the value given to these lands by percolating
waters not a part of the stream,-waters which
the owners of the land bad a right to convey to
a distance for sale.
The Court expressing the opinion that,
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* * * aside from the water flowing in the subterranean portion of the stream, as defined by
the instructions, there is no evidence to prove the
existence of any considerable quantity of percolating water in the tract condemned, * * *
and, since only a very small portion of the 315acre tract is higher than the bed of the stream,
the percolating waters which they could drain
without interference with the stream would be
too inconsiderable in amount, and their right too
precarious, to add materially to the value of the
land. (57 Pac. 592)
The City sought to condemn the fee in 315 acres
of land in the course of a subterranean stream, which
acreage the City required for the construction of its
collection and diversion facilities.

Is there anything

unusual in that the percolating waters in the land condemned not tributary to the natural stream were to be
considered as a part of the land and to be paid for as
such? The court could hardly have held otherwise.
We cited the case in part for its definition of a
natural stream (Respondent's Brief, pages 82 to 86),
concluding that within that definition the copper solutions in Dixon Gulch flowed along a course known and
defined and, if water, then as a natural stream. We fail
to understand how the California decision can have any
further relevancy to the issue before this court in the
case at bar. By the suit at bar plaintiff seeks to condemn merely an easement or right of way over and across
Tract D for the conve)'lance of its copper solutions, arti69

ficially produced by it in its dumps or deposits made
at higher elevations in Dixon Gulch. Plaintiff does not
seek to condemn the fee, nor to take anything whatever
out of defendants' land. Tract D condemned has no
capacity for the production of copper solutions, and copper solutions only, constitute the subject matter of
the present controversy. Were it not for plaintiff's
industry and investment Tract D would be barren
of any copper solutions. That fact was found by the
court below and is overwhelmingly sustained by the
evidence. The City of Los Angeles in the case discussed was not required to pay for the water of the
natural stream. Its interest therein was paramount to
the riparian right of the land condemned. Of course
the City of Los Angeles was not required to pay for
percolating waters within the land condemned that were
tri butary to the natural stream.
1

What a travesty upon the law it would be in the
case at bar were defendants' contention to prevail and
the plaintiff be required to pay a second time for the
copper solutions i,t had once artificially produced by
its effort, industry and expenditure, simply because
those solutions of necessity flow down a precipitous
gulch over a channel otherwise barren of such solutions,
over which channel plaintiff had condemned an easement for their transportation to its intake, upon the
value of which easement the parties had agreed and the
purchase price for which easement had been paid
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into court and the final order of condemnation made and
entered, the only remaining point at issue being that
these defendants insist that they should be paid in addition the value of the copper solutions the plaintiff
had produced as the result of plaintiff',s great expenditure and investment already made. Is it any wonder
that one's difficulty lay in comprehending defendants'
contention and that such contention cannot be otherwise
characterized than as ridiculous and absurd in law.

VI
Point
Dried Up Water

At page 21 of the Reply Brief for Appellants, we
are informed that there is no evidence that the little
pools of copper solutions dried up, that the statement
is wholly unsupported by the evidence and we are asked
to "produce any evidence sustaining such statement."
The Hays lower cut was a cut made by the defendants across the outcrop of the porpryry dike below the
sulphide ledge or vein and below the copper and fresh
water inclines. Copper solutions collected in the Hays
lower cut, and the defendants urged this as an independent source of supply. Concerning the Hays lower cut
Mr. Hanson testified in part as follows:
I have not observed a seepage or percolation of water anywhere within this porphyry dike;
(Tr. 2806) * * *
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I have seen the Hays lower cut with copper
water in it and I have seen it dry and I have
seen it with what appeared to me to be fresh
water. Last fall I observed the Hays lower cut
to contain copper water. This spring I was up
Dixon Gulch the day after-I wouldn't say definitely the date, but within a day or so after
the two inclines had been siphoned out, and at
that time the Hays lower cut was dry, containing
nothing but mud and dry mud at that in the bottom of it.

A few days after that I was in Dixon Gulch
again and at that time the Utah Copper Company
had been bailing out the fresh water incline with
buckets so as to enable us to get into the bottom
and at that particular time the copper water
incline was not filled up ,sufficiently to require
bailing and at that time my observation was that
the water in the Hays lower cuts was practically
fresh water. (Tr. 2807)
You could see the trench down the hillside
in the surface wash from the two inclines where
they had been drained out and bucketed out; two
trenches came down the side of the hill, converged down here on the porphyry dike and the
flow was in a northeasterly direction along the
porphyry dike into the Hays lower cut, and the
direction of that flow was very apparent at that
time. My conclusion was that the water was derived from surface seepage from the two inclines.
(Tr. 2808).
There were in addition two cuts made along the
sulphide vein north of the copper water incline and concerning them Mr. Earl testified as follows (Tr. 2158):
I recall two cuts along that sulphide vein
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* * * I sa,w them when they were working
on them :and I saw them since. The cut that
was there last fall is just north of the copper
water incline. When the copper water incline
was siphoned out, that cut dried up. I believe,
my recollection right now is, that it dried up
before the copper incline was siphoned out; it
was dried up after the copper incline was opened
up and before it was siphoned out. (Tr. 2158)
* * *
There is no water making in the cut that
has been more recently made, the one still farther
to the north on 'the sulphide vein, north of the
north incline. (Tr. 2160)
Concerning the Hays lower cut, Mr. Marsh testified
as follows (Tr. 2863):
I have observed water in the Hays lower
cut below the quartize ledge. The quantity of that
water is very small, I should say not more than
four gallons a day. I have made several observations and study in regard to the source of that
water. My conclusion is that the water in the
Hays lower cut, which has been marked in the
square in blue with dashes on it on exhibit 104
(Tr. 2863) has its origin or source from the fresh
water incline and also from the copper incline
at times when there is an overflow in the drain
tunnel, it would have a source from there also.
Those waters flow directly over the quartzite
ledge down the slope until they pass directly over
the porphyry dyke and where the sulphide fissure
is located in the porphyry dyke there would be a
certain amount of these waters find their way and
percolate and pass downward and intercept the
Hays lower cut.
I have observed this Hays lower cut to be
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dry. On June 2rrd of this year both the fresh
water incline and the copper incline were siphoned
out and about two days after that the Hays
lower cut dried completely up. That was ,simply
due to siphoning these waters out and when there
was no more water to cause an overflow why simply the cut dried up. (Tr. 2864)
With relation to the Hays cut on the sulphide vein
just north of the copper water incline, Mr. Beeson testified (Tr. 2653):
Q.

What was the point marked 34?

A. That is the open cut which is just to the
north of the copper incline. The water in that
particular cut was coming from the copper incline because they are both right there together.
* * * We found the water in the open cut
ceased to run when the incline was drained.
Concerning the copper and fresh water inclines and
the Hays lower cut, Mr. Beeson testified (Tr. 2657-58):
Later on those copper waters from the Railway drain tunnel had been sealed off and prevented from percolating down along these surface cracks and coming in along the top of this
copper incline and the fact that the copper
content decreased shortly after the waters were
diverted would indicate that there is no question but wbat the copper content of the waters
in the copper incline was due to seepage or leaking of this water from the B and G drain tunnel
and from the pipe which conducted those waters
down to the intake on r:L'ract C. The fresh water
incline filled up shortly after that with the same
character of water as was there formerly which
was fresh water, so that I would say from those
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~two

observations that the water coming from
along the sulphide vein or from these three or
four observations was from fresh water except
where it had received its copper content from the
waters of the Band G drain tunnel.

Q. What became of the water in the Hays
lower cut?
A. I don't believe that I noticed a great difference in the water because it was apparently
fed from the leaking or running of the water appearing on the sulphide vein and from leaks
in the pipe line where it derived its copper content, and the salt experiment also showed there
was a slight increase in the sodium chloride in
the water in the Hays cut so that I would decide
that got its copper content from the same source.
The copper water incline did not dry up but its
waters lost their copper content in a degree commensurate with the effectiveness with which had been accomplished the sealing off of the railway drain tunnel waters.
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 103, 111, 112, 114, Tr. 2153, 2941
to 2977, 3007).

The flow of water from the north or

copper incline was so small it was collected in an eight
ounce bottle and it took two minutes thirty-three seconds
to fill that eight ounce bottle, that being at the rate of
thirty-five gallons in twenty-four hours. (Tr. 2153).
After the

wa~ter

had been siphoned out of the copper

water incline a sample was taken from a pool that had
collected in the bottom of the incline and the analysis
of that sample (Ex. 86) ran 0.91 pounds per thousand
gallons (Tr. 2155).
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VII
Point
"At first, plaintiff's witnesses testified that these waters
passed through the French drain, but a reading of the evidence of Mr. Beeson showed that that was completely abandoned." Reply Brief for Appellants, page 38. "They completely destroyed and filled up to the so-called French drain
which plaintiff at first relied upon for the passage of these
waters through the railroad fill, and they did it so effectually
and so completely that counsel for plaintiff finally, in open
court, announced the abandonment of such an idea, and it
was never heard of again." Reply Brief for Appellants, page 40.

Counsel know better than the above and that the
court may understand that Mr. Beeson's testimony is
not susceptible to such interpretation and that plaintiff
rat no time altered or abandoned its contention as to the
porosity of the westerly slope of the railway fill and
its French drain construction, let us observe Mr. Beeson's 'testimony as follows:

Tt is just as reasonable as it possibly can
be the water would percolate down through that
fill (Tr. 2666) behind the Band G track * * *
I was present when that water was placed on the
B and G fill 1and I observed the measurements
also that were taken down at point 60 and at
point 58, 60 being the position that the waters
come out from under the fill which has been called the Hays Spring and 58 is the portal of the
B and G drain 'tunnel.
When the water was applied at point 61
sometime 1ater, there was a considerable increase
in the flow at the point 60, indicating that the
waters had passed down through this B and G
fill into the bottom of the gulch and passed right
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on down that channel, coming out at 60. A later
experiment was made by placing water at the
point which I will mark as 63 also indiC'ated by
a figure 2 on this map. The waters placed on
the D dump at that position flowed down through
the dump and encountered the natural surface of
the side hill and part ·Of the water flowed down
through the bottom of the gulch and percolated
down through the fill, going on down and came
out at the point 60 or the position called the
Hays Spring. I would say in the former experiment there was no change in the water coming
through the B and G drain tunnel and in this
experiment ,there was an increase in the water
passing under the fill (Tr. 2667) and also in the
water passing through the drain tunnel, which
was directly due to the application of the water
at the point 63. A later experiment was performed-In all ,these experiments the water applied there was fresh water. I believe the copper content went up considerably when the water
was applied because it was flushing out the copper minerals which had accumulated in the dump,
and then water was applied at a point marked
64. This water apparently flowed down to the
bottom of the gulch and made an increase at the
point 60 where it came out from under the B and G
fill at the position called the Hays Spring. On
the last experiment there was no increase in the
water of the B and G drain tunnel because those
waters apparently reached the bottom of the
gulch and passed through there and found an
easy enough channel to pass through that railroad fill without increasing the flow from that
drain tunnel. (Tr. 2668) * * *

* * * I have found no evidence here
which indicates 'that any of that copper water is
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coming down and mingling with those fresh waters * * * But on the other hand, the copper
water coming out of the so-called Hays Spring
is almost identical with the copper water coming
out of the portal of the B and G drain tunnel, so
I assume that they have a common source in
this dump.
If they had passed down through rocks and
come out, they would certainly mingle with fresh
waters, and there would be a very considerable
difference in the copper content.
Summarizing, from my testimony, it is my
opinion that no part of the water appearing
through the railroad fill at the point the defendants have indicated as the Hays ,Spring has
found its way beneath the surface of bed rock.
(Tr. 2671).
And with relation to the four demonstrations of
the porosity of the westerly slope of the railway fill,
Mr. Marsh testified:
During the fall of 1928 we performed several
experiments by putting water back of this socalled impervious dam and in each instance it
was very conclusive to me that that water passed
through this so-called impervious dam, and either
came out through the B and G drain tunnel or out
through the so-called Hays Spring. Those experiments were very conclusive, and proved to
me without a doubt that the B and G fill there
was not impervious at all, but was rather porous,
and would permit any water which was placed
in any way, by nature or artificially, back of this
west slope, that it would pass through the fill
and enter at a point either through the B and G
drain tunnel or at the so-called Hays Spring.
(Tr. 3017)
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And Mr. Earl testified upon this subject in part
as follows:
From my observation of fills similarly constructed with all these characteristics of drainage areas above them and all my experience, as
to the length of time that would be required to
render any portion of the west slope of the B
and G railroad fill in Dixon Gulch impervious to
the passage, seepage and percolation of water
through it-I don't think that the fill in Dixon
Gulch would ever become impervious. The water conditions continuing as they have in the
past during my observation, the water would continue to flow through that fill in much greater
quantities than ever has been known to come out
of the so-called Hays Spring. (Tr. 2211)
We acknowledge counsel's discovery of an error on
page 43 of Respondent's Brief in our description of
Experiment No. 2 in that the flow there stated as from
'
the Hays Spring was in fact from the B. & G. Railway
drain tunnel, while the flow there stated as from the
drain tunnel wa.s in fact from the Hays Spring, all of
which clearly appears upon the several references furnished for the statement. 'The proof of the porosity
of the railway fill is, of course, equally convincing as
stated with the correction. The purpose ·of the experiments was convincingly accomplished in the words of
Mr. Marsh (Tr. 1452), "Simply to prove our own ideas;
we alway,s knew that there was water going through
the B. & G. fill, but to prove beyond a doubt this demonstration was made."
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VIII
Point
"What is a Ditch." Reply Brief for Appe 1Iants, pages 93
to 96.

Apparently counsel's idea of a water course, a defined channel, a natural stream, ditch, outlet, drain, etc.,
is a channel that is free from any obstruction or impediment whatever along which courses water in a
single undivided and unobstructed mass. Counsel heartily approve of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597,
57 Pac. 585, and they should not have overlooked the
clear definition of a natural stream or water course
therein contained and universally accepted. (Respondent's Brief, pages 83 and 84). The underground water
course, by that decision defined as a natural stream,
flowed at the rate of only 14 to 17 miles per annum.
Its greatest width was 12 miles and its narrowest part
from 2000 feet to 3 miles and the water constituting
that natural stream filled the voids or interstices of an
''alluvial or other deposit made up of loam, sand, gravel
and boulders, mixed together and interspersed with
broken or irregular strata or masses of clay or cemented
sand and gravel." In the case at bar the narrow channel is defined by the walls of Dixon Gulch. In the
Pomeroy case the course was defined by two parallel
ranges of hills miles part. If in the case at bar the
copper solutions be water, they certainly flow down a
known and defined course or channel and constitute a
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natural stream, whatever may be the law with relation
to their appropriation.

IX
Point
Costs

We quote from the reply brief for appellants at
page 104 as follows:
On page 123 plaintiff says: ''The costs taxed
were not incurred in ascertaining the amount of
the compensation to which the owner was entitled by reason of the taking;'' etc. rrrue. The
main question in this case is whether or not the
plaintiff is by this action taking the defendants'
copper solutions. The land itself without the
solutions is of comparatively little value.
"The land itself without the solutions" is all the
plaintiff can and all it seeks to take by this action.
Plaintiff already has the solutions. Defendants have
none to give. We think the authorities cited in respondent's brief make it very clear that the issue as to
who owns the solutions had no proper place in this condemnation suit. Plaintiff did not object to the trial
of that issue here. It was agreeruble to plaintiff that
that issue be so determined and the parties are bound
by the result, but when it comes to the taxation of costs,
the trial of that issue has nothing whatever to do with
the constitutional provision against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. There
is nothing in the constitutional provision to permit a
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defendant in a condemnation suit to try issues of title
to property not sought to be condemned with the certainty that all costs incurred therein shall be paid by the
condemner, however frivolous may be the defendant's
claim and unsuccessful the defendant's effort.

Costs

go as of course to the successful party in the trial of
such issues. The constitutional provision serves to insure fair compensation to the landowner for the land
taken, 'but in the case at bar the parties stipulated upon
that amount and the sum so stipulated was paid into
court. That issue of value of the tract taken, as counsel
admit, was not the subject of this law suit for the "land
itself is of comparative little value." It is, of course,
only because of the constitutional provision referred to
that the rule has arisen in condemnation suits, wherein
the real and ultimate issue is of the value of the tract
taken and damages to the balance of the larger tract
by reason of the taking, that the costs so incurred must
be paid by the condemner. To the suit at bar the constitutional provision does not apply, because the only
issue with which the constitutional provision is concerned was in fact never in the case. No testimony was
taken and no costs incurred with relation to it.
Were the question of title tried in the suit at
bar one relating to the tract condemned, Section 7338,
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, would, of course, apply,
for by that section courts are given power in a condemnation suit "to hear and determine all adverse or
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conflicting claims to the property sought to be condemned." In the case at bar no copper solutions are
''sought to be condemned.'' In the case at bar no copper solutions have been nor could be condemned.
Were the plaintiff seeking to condemn through the
defendants' property a right of way for the construction
and operation of a tunnel to f,acilitate the mining of
ground within the vertical boundaries of plaintiff's lode
claims, the defendants might with equal propriety plead
as a defense to the condemnation suit that the defendants were the owners of the apex of the lode plaintiff was seeking to mine. If such a defense were to be
allowed the parties would be forthwith plunged into an
apex suit, wherein the plaintiff condemner, upon the
theory of the defendants in the suit at bar, would be
required to pay the costs, although entirely successful
in the apex litigation and even though the trial of those
issues had consumed months of time and thousands of
pages of testimony. In such a suit the right to condemn
would be no clearer than in the case ~at bar, both being
as clear as could well be imagined upon any conceivable
set of facts.

In the case suggeS'ted as well as in the

suit at bar the damages to be recovered for the property
taken would be nominal merely, the only thing of value
being the ore body, which was, of course, not being condemned, no more than are the copper solutions in the
case at bar. If any court has held that a simple condemnation suit of relatively little or no importance can
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be so converted into an apex suit, a suit to quiet title to
an ore body of great value, as intricate, complex, prolonged and costly as such suits usually are, and the
plaintiff condemner be required to pay the costs in any
event, we would like very much to be advised of any
authority upon which such a ruling could be justified.
That would be stretching the constitutional provision
with a vengeance, but no more so than the defendants
would have this court do in the oase at bar. Of course
such a defense should be denied in a condemnation suit
and the defendants in such suit be relegated to an action
to quiet title and for injunotive relief. The condemnation suit should be preserved as such. If the condemning party should find he had no ore body to mine he
would have acquired an easement to no purpose; likewise in the case at bar should plaintiff discover that
it had no title to the dumps in Dixon Gulch, from which
plaintiff is producing the copper solutions in question,
plaintiff would by the case at bar have acquired an
easement to no purpose, but defendants admit that they
could not for that reason have injected into this case a
defense predicated upon plaintiff's lack of title to its
dumps.
It is only by reason of the constitutional pro-

vision and the fact that if applicable it transcends the
statute that defendants can find anything upon which
to predicate an argument upon this point. But neither
the constitutional prov1s10n nor defendants' right to
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costs is broadened at all by plain tiff's consent to the
trial in this condemnation suit of the defendants' claim
of title. Plaintiff is not now and never was interested
in any copper solutions upon the defendants' premises.
Plaintiff knows there are no copper solutions upon defendants' premises. Plaintiff has been always and is
now interested only in the copper solutions it has been
producing and is now producing upon its own premises.
Plaintiff knows and has proved in this case that the copper solutions it has produced and is now producing upon
its own premises are the only copper solutions about
which this controversy is being waged. Plaintiff does
not by this action seek to condemn copper solutions of
any sort and plaintiff cannot by this action condemn any
such. The authorities cited by defendants upon this
point are foreign to the is·sue.
The proceeding in eminent domain is a creature
of the statute and the power of the court in such
proceeding is defined and limited by the statute accordingly. We, therefore, look to Section 7338, Compiled Laws of Utah, 19U, for that definition as follows:
'The court or judge thereof shall have power :
1.

To determine the conditions specified in

§ 7333; to determine the places of making con-

nections and crossings, ~and to regulate the manner thereof and of enjoying the common use mentioned in sub. 5, § 7332;
2.

To hear and determine all adverse or con85

flicting claims to the property sought to be
condemned, and to the damages therefor;
3. To determine the respective rights of
different parties seeking condemnation of the
same property.
,The conditions specified in Sec. 7333 are the following:
Before property can be taken it must appear;
1. That the use to which it is to be applied
is a use authorized by law;

2.

That the taking is necessary to such use;

3. If already appropriated to some public
use that the public use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use.
Counsel seize upon the fir1st "that the use to which
it (the property condemned) is to be applied is a use
authorized by law'' as the basis of the defendant's
contention.
The conclusion upon the issue of ownership of the
copper solutions is not determinative of the question
a1s to whether or not the property taken is to be applied
to a use authorized by law. Whether or not the use is
a public use, is to be ascertained by an inspection of
the complaint, wherein it is alleged that the use is to be
the conveyance of copper solutions from dumps above
in Dixon Gulch, over Tract D to the intake on Tract C.
After devoting some months to the trial of a suit to
quiet title to the copper solutions flowing across Tract
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D, the court by its findings on that issue in plaintiff's
favor was assisted not at all to a conclusion as to
whether or not the use to which the property was to be
applied was a use authorized by law.
Had this sui·t proceeded in the orthodox fashion
of a condemnation suit and plaintiff had taken its judgment and final order of condemnation and then been
una!ble to establish title to the copper solutions, for the
conveyance of which it had acquired the easement condemned, plaintiff might have found itself with an easement for which it had no use, although, nevertheless,
the use to which the land condemned was to have been
applied was a use authorized by law and thereby the
statutory provisions had

been fully

complied with.

Plaintiff could not have devoted the easement to any
other use. It might not have been used at all, but the
defendants would not have been injured in tha·t event,
and neither the courts nor litigants in such proceedings
are required to devote months to the trial of collateral
issues positively to determine in advance that there will
be no hitch in the condemner's carrying out its intended
purpose fully and completely. It has been decided many
times tliat it is no defense to a condemnation suit that
the condemner has no funds with which to pay for the
land taken, or that a municipality, for instance, would
thereby incur an indebtedness in excess of its debt
limit, or that no appropriation had been made whereby
to defray the expense of the project, or that the proper
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antecedent steps had been taken upon which to provide
requisite tax levies whereby to finance the project, or
that the sum provided was inadequate and the source of
the funds with which a city pays for lands condemned
is of no concern to the landowner. 20 C. J. 909, § 327.
It must be obvious to all that whether or not plaintiff
could maintain its condemnation suit did not depend
upon plaintiff's ownership of any property at all. The
landowner's protection lay in the necessity that plaintiff
pay for what it takes and the condemner is not apt to
pay for something for which it will have no use. Accordingly it has been held that a public service company may exerci,se the power of eminent domain before
performing any public service. Deseret Water, Oil
& Irrigation Go. v. State, 167 Cal. 147, 138 Pac. 981.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain may be
the first step toward the acquisition of property in the
condemner's performance of a public service.
Whether or not the use to which the land taken was
to be applied was a use authorized by law was determined by an inspection of the complaint and not by an inquiry into what, if any, property plaintiff then owned.
The lengthy, exhaustive and expensive trial of defendants' claim of tide to the copper solutions was nothing
other than a title suit that had been injected into this
condemnation proceeding by defendants because no
one objected, and costs to be awarded therein should be
upon rules applic-able to such causes. The conS'titu88

tional provision, of course, has nothing to do with the
question.
X
Point
The Form of the Judgment

In the coul"se of the oral argument defendants'
counsel ridiculed the following provision in the judgment (Abs. 673) and final order of condemnation (Ahs.
683):

* * * that, before any material shall be
dumped upon said tracts, or any of them, or
any other or different use be made thereof, said
defendant Stephen Hays Estate, Inc., shall have
given plaintiff thirty days' notice in writing of
such intention, and of the character of the use to
which said premises shall be so subjected, and
thereupon plaintiff shall have the right and privilege at plaintiff's expense of relocating and recollJstructing plain tiff's f acili ties affected thereby
to and upon such other unoccupied tracts of land,
if any there may be, owned by defendants, or any
of them, from which no interference shall result
with the said operations of said defendant Stephen
Hays Estate, Inc.
The form of that judgment and final order of condemn'ation was stipulated (Abs. 651), a fact counsel
did not explain. The defendants assigned no error
with relation to that or any other feature of the judgment, the error assigned being merely that a judgment
had been made and entered against defendants. In
view of the stipulation it ill becomes counsel to point
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with ridicule to the very provision for which they expressly stipulated.
Conclusion

There is no error in the record. The findings are
supported by the evidence and the judgment below should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DICKSON,
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